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Farmland is a durable asset which tends to be a residual claimant 
on farm income. Changes in land values resulted in major real wealth 
gains to owners in the 1970s and wealth losses in the 1980s. 
Land is one of the most important factors in agriculture. Land 
1.s not only a primary input in agriculture but also is collateral to 
secure loans for many farmers. Such loans may be utilized for 
investment or operating funds. Thus land indirectly is a source of 
capital and funding for production inputs. The amount of loan which 
can be obtained from financial institutions usually depends on the 
value of the farmland. Since the early 1930s the nominal land value 
has trended upward until recently when its value in some regions 
either declined or stabilized. This phenomenon is puzzling many 
economists and the people who are involved .in the farming business. 
The USDA publication "Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector" 
shows that real estate comprises the largest share of farm assets for 
most regions (USDA, 1984). Nationally, U.S. farm real estate, valued 
at $818. 9 billion, comprised three-fourths of the value of total farm 
assets in 1983 (USDA, 1983). The data also indicate that real estate 
debts from 1979 to 1983 increased for most states. Declining real 
estate values in the 1980s imply capital losses as opposed to capital 
1 
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gains from real estate in previous decades. The lender hesitates to 
extend credit because of shortfalls in loan security. The situation 
creates problems for many farmers expecting to use their real estate 
as collateral for operating funds. In this and other ways farm real 
estate value causes financial hardship for many farmers. 
Land tends to be the most durable and immobile of farm resources. 
Its basic properties either do not change over time or change so 
slowly that land is considered to have an infinite life. Land is so 
fixed to agriculture that its value over much of the nation u 
determined endogenously by its earning power in producing crops and 
livestock. This is unlike other inputs whose value is determined 
mostly by industries outside of agriculture. However, it has been 
suspected that anticipated capital gains from holding farmland, farm 
programs, population pressure and some other factors outside the 
agricultural sector caused the increases in farmland price in the 
1970s. Recently, the direction of farmland price has changed as shown 
in Table I. The value of farmland started to decline in 1982, 
especially for the Lake States, Corn Belt, and Southeast. For many 
other regions and states, farmland value started to decline in 1983. 
In the Northeast and Southern Plains, farmland value for most states 
did not decrease. Nevertheless, the overall acr'eage of farmland 
values for 48 states started to decline in 1982. Farmland value 
averaged $795 per acre ~n 1981, but decreased to $739 per acre in 
1984. A major purpose of this research will be to estimate the 




FARM REAL ESTATE VALUE: AVERAGE VALUE PER 
ACRE OF LAND AND BUILDINGS BY STATE, 
GROUPED BY FARM PRODUCTION REGION 
State 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Dollars 
Northeast 
Mama 375 414 464 538 579 612 636 649 691 
New Hampshire 625 696 787 919 988 1,045 1,087 1,109 1,181 
Vermont 496 533 584 660 710 751 781 797 849 
Massachusetts 1,044 1,138 1,261 1,443 1,552 1,641 1,707 1,741 1,854 
Rhode Island 1,650 1,821 2,045 2,370 2,548 2,696 2,804 2,860 3,046 
Connecllcut 1,645 1,780 1,960 2,227 2,395 2,533 2,634 2,687 2,862 
New York 553 587 600 670 708 749 786 770 793 
New Jersey 2,106 2,211 2,386 2,701 2,926 2,998 3,118 3,056 3,148 
Pennsylvama 820 994 1,115 1,273 1,404 1,447 1,332 1,279 1,381 
Delaware 1,114 1,250 1,350 1,500 1,755 1,843 1,659 1,659 1,692 
Maryland 1,280 1,353 1,579 1,800 2,251 2,556 2,416 2,174 2,239 
Lake States 
M1ch1gan 609 778 877 975 1,082 1,232 1,192 1,109 1,109 
W1scons•n 496 598 718 856 980 1,105 1,073 1,019 958 
Mmnesota 529 672 761 901 1,061 1,231 1,197 1,065 990 
Corn Bell 
Oh10 846 1,099 1,224 1,483 1,678 1,727 1,474 1,297 1,245 
lnd1ana 888 1,188 1,357 1,589 1,833 1,972 1,715 1,492 1,477 
IllinOIS 1,062 1,458 1,625 1,858 2,013 2,133 1,940 1,727 1,692 
Iowa 920 1,259 1,331 1,550 1,811 1,941 1,802 1,568 1,396 
MISSOun 456 548 641 726 878 941 872 759 759 
Northern Plams 
Norlh Dakota 236 274 300 347 399 423 436 414 414 
South Dakota 163 194 227 256 273 290 291 271 263 
Nebraska 363 420 412 525 600 660 626 563 495 
Kansas 342 398 418 501 573 590 585 544 528 
Appalach•an 
V1rg1n1a 633 701 774 930 1,009. 1,080 1,040 1,050 1,040 
West Virginia 393 430 459 592 704 751 829 829 804 
North Carolina 676 759 830 1,051 1,215 1,331 1,284 1,297 1,362 
Kentucky 514 619 715 861 955 991 996 966 927 
Tennessee 528 618 736 860 953 1,024 972 923 951 
Southeast 
South Carolina 515 600 653 773 879 930 918 863 846 
Georgia 507 581 685 777 868 915 842 817 801 
Flonda 763 861 981 1,149 1,352 1,507 1,432 1,461 1,490 
Alabama 425 477 527 639 792 935 922 876 858 
Delta States 
MISSISSIPPI 408 461 567 681 825 1,047 1,000 920 966 
Arkansas 475 542 606 770 921 1,061 1,104 983 944 
louiSiana 575 665 818 1,001 1,288 1,519 1,511 1,481 1,481 
Southern Plams 
Oklahoma 345 394 450 512 604 662 696 661 661 
Texas 274 299 337 386 448 492 576 593 646 
Mountain States 
Montana 134 157 176 196 229 239 254 236 241 
Idaho 386 454 515 585 669 717 753 700 700 
Wyommg 98 110 121 144 153 164 170 162 165 
Colorado 219 256 273 322 376 412 419 411 423 
New Mex1co 86 101 112 143 190 203 211 200 204 
Anzona 122 138 154 199 264 282 294 279 285 
Utah 227 271 308 400 530 567 590 561 572 
Nevada 98 112 140 191 253 271 282 268 273 
Paclf1c States 
Washington 438 535 602 692 725 854 888 888 915 
Oregon 294 342 414 504 556 605 611 580 574 
California 711 759 914 1,186 1,426 1,735 1,905 1,925 1,925 
48 States 397 474 531 628 725 795 789 743 739 
'These values are based on land·value benchmarks obtamed trom the Census of Agnculture. For mtercensal years, mterpolauons and extrapola· 
t10ns are made ustng the mdexes 1n table 1. For some years, the dollar values show changes that dtlfer from the changes shown tn table 1 
Source: u.s. Department of Agr-i-culture;-- 1984a.--
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Study Objectives 
Many econometric studies have analyzed sources of farm land price 
changes in the past. Most models, however, did not show whether 
systematic regional and state differences were apparent in determining 
land value models. 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
I. To examine the factors that influence farmland value and the ratio 
of rent to farmland price. 
2. To use econometric models to evaluate elements which affect 
farmland value and ratio of rent to farmland price in each state. 
3. To test whether or not models developed in (2) have the same 
structure across states. 
4. To test the structural stability of models in (2) over time. 
5. To examine the impact of expected inflation on the structure of 
the model developed in (2). 
Hypotheses 
Hypotheses to be tested include: 
I. Farmland price at the state level is determined by factors both 
inside and outside the agricultural sector. 
2. No differences exist among states in the economic structure 
determining farmland models. 
3. The economic determinants of farmland price do not vary over time. 
4. Changes in anticipated inflation have no impact on farmland 
models. 
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Overview of Research Procedure 
To investigate sources or factors which influence farmland value 
for each state in the U.S., an econometric model is useful to express 
farmland price structure. To estimate coefficients for the studied 
model, time series data from 1950 to 1982 will be used. Variables to 
be included in the model will be selected based on theory and previous 
empirical studies. The ordinary least squares procedure is used to 
estimate coefficients in the models. 
The test for structural stability will be performed across states 
and time periods by segmenting data and by introducing dummy variables 
into the model. 
Outline of Thesis 
The remainder of this study is divided into five chapters. The 
conceptual framework and literature review will be presented in 
Chapter II. The statistical tests procedure to be used in this study 
will also be illustrated in this chapter. Data will be defined and 
their sources identified in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, the 
econometric models for each state will be estimated by us1.ng the 
r e 1 a t ion s h i p s in C h a p t e r I I and the d a t a in C h a p t e r I I I. The 
structural test for parameter changes across time periods and states 
will be performed in Chapter V. The hypothesis that inflation has no 
real impact on farmland price will also be tested in this chapter. 
Finally, Chapter VI will contain the summary and conclusion of the 
study as well as recommendations for further study. 
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter 1s to present the conceptual 
framework used in this study. The important variables included in the 
model will be presented as well as the justification behind their 
inclusion. The hypothetical impact of independent variables on the 
dependent variable will be stated. In addition the econometric model 
for this study will be specified for use in later chapters. 
Review of Past Econometric Models 
Explaining Farmland Value 
Many studies have analyzed farmland value at both the regional 
and national level. Research on this topic peaked during the 1960s 
(Brake and Melichar, 1977). The large recent capital losses and 
financial stress caused by falling farmland value have prompted 
reexamination of causal economic forces. 
Most econometric models developed to determine farmland value 
either utilized multi-equation or single-equation models. Three well 
known econometric models used simultaneous equations to explain the 
U.S. farm real estate market. These models were presented by Tweeten 
and Nelson (1966; see also Tweeten and Martin, 1966), Herdt and 
Cochrane (1966), and Reynolds and Timmons (1969). Because of the 
complexity of the multiple equation models, those models will be 
presented below in some detail. 
6 
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The first model was developed by Tweeten and Nelson in 1966. 
This model utilized multi-equations to predict U.S. farm real estate 
price variation. The model was composed of 5 equations and was 
estimated empirically by recursive and ordinary least squares. The 
period under study was 1923 to 1963. The relationship of the 
variables is summarized as follows: 
p f(Lt, At, Tt; Ft-1' r t-1' pt-1) 
L = f(Ct' F t-1' Lrt, Et, Lt-1) 
c = f(F 1 , Lr , t- t T2, ct-1) 
A f(JXt-1' Cgt-1' st, T2, At-1) 
T = f(JXt-1' Cgt-1' st, T2, Tt-l) 
where 
A number of farms; 
C = cropland used for crops; 
Cg = capital gains on farm real estate; 
E =employment, national nonfarm; 
F = net farm income; 
JX = ratio of average earning per employed factory workers 
to the average income per farm worker; 
Lr =land removed from production by government programs; 
L = land in farms; 
p price index of u.s 0 farm real estate per acre; 
r rate of return; 
s stock of machinery; 
T = transfers of farm real estate; and 
T2 = dummy variable equal to 1 from 1942 to 1948 and to 0 
otherwise. 
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Results from the above model indicate that the major source of 
increase in farmland price were capital gains and farm consolidation 
for agricultural factors and nonfarm employment for nonfarm factors. 
Pope, Kramer, Green, and Gardner (1977) updated the model by using 
more recent data (1946-1972). The results, however, showed a nu-mber 
of sign changes and lack of· statistical significance for the 
reestimated coefficients. These contradictory or inconsistent results 
suggest that there were changes 1.n variables or structure influencing 
farm real estate between these two periods. 
The second multi-equation model was developed by Herdt and 
Cochrane (1966) to determine the impact of technology on farmland 
prices. The demand and supply model was as follows: 
Ns = f(P, R, U, Lf) (supply) 
Nd f(P, R, T, Pr/Pp, Lu, G) (demand) 
Nd = Ns (market clearing relation) 
where N s , N d, and P were endogenously determined by the model. The 
variables were identified as follows: 
Ns number of farms supplied, 
Nd = number of farms demanded, 
P = price of farmland, 
R = interest rate, 
U = unemployment as a percentage of civilian labor 
force, 
Lf =land in farms, 
T = USDA productivity index 
Pr/Pp = ratio of the index of prices received by farmers to 
the index of prices paid by farmers, 
9 
L = urban land, and 
u 
G = general price level (wholesale price index). 
Their research indicated that the expectation of rising income 
from technological advance in conjunction with farm price supports was 
important in explaining the rise in farmland prices. They also 
cone luded that technological advance benefited not the farm operator 
but the farm land owner. 
The Herdt and Cochrane model was reestimated using more recent 
data (1946-1972 compared to 1913-1962) by Pope et al. (1977). This 
model also did not perform well when estimated with more recent data. 
Nevertheless, sign reversals were fewer in number than in the previous 
model. 
In a third model, Reynolds and Timmons ( 1969) used a two-equation 
recursive system to identify the main determinants of farmland prices 
in the U.s. from 1933 to 1965. They used both the concept of delayed 
decision making as did Tweeten and Nelson, and the concept of market 
equilibrium as did Herdt and Cochrane. The two equations follow: 
T = f(Du, D/E, La, E(F/NF), A, Cg, Cg(1933-1941)) 
(transfer equation) 
P = f(T, GPL, CP, CG, CG(33-41), A, 1/r, 
NFI(1956-1965)) (price equation) 
where 
Du = dummy for intercept variable during 1942-1947, 
D/E = ratio of debt to equity, 
La = proxy measure of technology, 
E(F /NF) = expected ratio of farm to nonfarm earnings, 
A = changes in average size of farm, 
Cg = expected capital gains, 
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p = farmland price, 
T = predicted voluntary transfers of farmland, 
GPL = government payment for land diversion, 
CP = conservation payment, 
r = rate of return on common stock, and 
NFI = expected net farm income. 
Based on the results of their model, they concluded that farmland 
value in the U.S. was affected by a number of variables. A positive 
effect was exerted by expected net farm income, government payments 
for land diversion, conservation payments, expected capital gains, 
farm enlargement, nonfarm population density, technological advance, 
and the ratio of debt to equity. On the other hand, a negative effect 
was exerted by voluntary transfers of farmland, capitalization rate, 
and expected ratio of farm to nonfarm earnings. This model also was 
updated by Pope et al. (1979) using data from 1946-1972. The results 
showed a number of changes in the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients. 
For the single-equation models, at least four studies attempted 
to identify the factors that impact on farmland value at the national 
level. Reinsel (1973), for example, used M2 money supply and 
population to predict the 1971 and 1972 national average value per 
acre. He did not incorporate local structural factors that affect 
land prices at the subnational level. 
In 1979, Duncan estimated the structural parameters for U.S. 
farmland values for 1929-1975 and for 1937-1975. He found that 
increases in land value more than kept pace with changes in general 
price level. Furthermore, the analysis of real changes in farm real 
11 
estate values indicated farm enlargement pressure, farm income, and 
capital gains expectations continued to be the most important 
determinants of land prices. 
Po p e e t a 1. ( 1 9 7 9 ) u s e d s in g 1 e e q u a t ion s t o e s t ima t e U • S • 
farmland value in a model that was a modification of an earlier model 
by Klinefelter (1973). The purpose o-f their study, however, was to 
compare the forecasting accuracy of a single-equation ordinary least 
squares model to that of the multiple-equation model. Their results 
showed that single equations provided as good or better short-term 
forecasts than multiple equations. 
Mart in and Heady ( 1982) used a single equation model to test 
Feldstein's hypothesis that changes in the expected rate of inflation 
should affect the real value of farmland. Based on their models, they 
found no strong evidence to support the hypothesis. Inflationary 
expectations did not appear to have direct impact on the value of U.S. 
farm real estate. However, they noted that the above hypothesis could 
be correct, but undetected by their model which assumed that 
expectations of inflation are formed adaptively. 
A number of studies analyzed determinants of farmland value at 
the regional level. A few will be discussed here. Klinefelter (1973) 
applied a single-equation model to explain the value of farmland and 
improvements. for Illinois between 1951-1970. He concluded that 97 
percent of the variation in land prices could be explained by net 
returns, average farm size, number of farm transfers, and expected 
capital gains. This model was updated by Kraft and Belbase (1983) to 
test for structural stability in the model during the 1970s. Sandrey, 
Arthur, Oliveira, and Wilson (1982) used a data base similar to that 
12 
used by Klinefelter. However, pooled county data were used instead o£ 
aggregate state data to estimate farmland values in Oregon from 1954 
to 1978. They found that income, average farm size, and percentage of 
farmland under irrigation had a significant effect on farmland value 
for the entire state during the study period. 
Chavas and Shumway ( 1982) analyzed farmland prices in Iowa by 
using pooled time-series and cross-section data. In contrast to the 
previous models, their model included price and yield of agricultural 
products such as corn, soybean, and hogs (price only) and an explicit 
measure of soil and climatic quality (called a "corn suitability 
rating") in the model along with the consumer price index. They 
cone luded that changes in commodities' prices as well as differences 
in the "corn suitability rating" explained farmland price in the study 
region. Clifton and Spurlock (1983) aggregated county data to form 
homogeneous markets throughout the Southeastern U.S. The markets were 
segmented by grouping counties with common characteristics. The 
single equation model of farmland values for each submarket was 
estimated for the period 1971-1979. Their results supported the 
hypothesis that a number of independently functioning land markets 
existed within the Southeastern region. Vollink (1978) conducted a 
study in North Carolina using agricultural conditions to divide the 
state into four homogeneous regions. The model for each region was 
estimated. Carriker, Curtis, and Johnson (1984) used cross-sectional 
data to estimate the value of farmland for each crop reporting 
district in Nebraska between 1978-1982. The ordinary least squares 
technique was employed to estimate coefficients. The majority of the 
models indicated that a structural change had occurred over the 
1978-1982 period. 
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Burton and Nelson (1982), using specific tract information 
acquired from legal records (1976 to 1978), estimated three individual 
county models of farmland prices in eastern Oklahoma. They concluded 
that rural real estate values were particularly influenced by date of 
sale, size of tract, value of improvements per acre, distance to 
nearest county seat and definitions of agricultural and 
nonagricultural real estate. Warmann (1984) evaluated factors which 
influenced the value of farmland in western Oklahoma by using stepwise 
regress ion. He utilized two types of data: ( 1) base data -- size of 
tract, productivity, time, distance to nearest town and city, 
population of nearest town and (2) supplemental data -- land 
characteristics such as value of improvements, proportion of tract in 
cropland and pasture, county assessed value per square mile, and miles 
of gravel road per 100 square miles. He concluded that soil 
productivity information is important in explaining land price 
variability. Land cover (type of vegetation) factors were not shown 
to be useful in explaining the variation in per acre farmland prices 
when combined with soil productivity information. 
It can be noted that the majority of previous analyses of 
farmland value utilized single-equation models rather than 
multi-equation models. The reason is that single-equation models give 
both estimation simplicity and forecasting reliability. As indicated 
by Pope et al. (1979), multi-equation models, although using more 
c omp 1 i cat e d techniques to estimate coefficients, gave forecasting 
results less satisfactory than the single-equation models. Taking 
this into account, a single-equation econometric model is chosen for 
this study. In the next section, the conceptual framework will be 
14 
developed. Va r i ab 1 e s which may influence farmland value will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Conceptual Framework 
This section wi 11 explore the conceptual framework for the land 
valuation model. The possible impact for each of several variables on 
farmland value will be cited as a guideline for testing each 
hypothesis. 
Classical Approach to Determine Farmland Value 
Theoretically, the market value of a farmland equals the present 
worth of all future earnings. Future land earnings may be expected to 
increase at rate i + i 1 where i is the inflation rate and i 1 is the 
rea 1 growth rate. The value of i 1 may be positive, zero, or negative 
depending on whether land earnings increase in excess of na.tional 
inflation rate, equal to the national inflation rate, or less than 
nat ion a 1 inflation rate. The formula for land value can be expressed 
as: 
t = 00 (i + i I )t 
J R0e vo dt = kt e 
t = 0 (1) 
t = 00 -(r - i I )t _/ R0e dt 
t = 0 
vo = R0/(r - i I) (2) 
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where 
Ro = earnings 1n the current period, 
k = r + i or nominal discount factor, 
r = anticipated or desired real discount factor, 
• I 1· = anticipated real growth of R, 
i = anticipa.ted inflation rate. 
This formula shows that current land value depends on current land 
earnings, anticipated real discount factor, and anticipated real 
growth of land earnings. 
Where the return on land is expected to increase at the inflation 




Land value in this scenario depends on only current earnings and the 
anticipated real discount factor. If it is anticipated that land 
earnings will not keep up with inflation so that R0 = R1 = ••• Rn' 
then the land value relationship in (1) can be expressed as: 
(4) 
This 1 as t case is where land earnings behave like a bond by paying a 
constant nominal return (expected rate of increase in nominal land 
earnings = 0). 
To illustrate var1ous situations regarding the theory of land 
pricing in a well-functioning land market, assume that r is .05 or 5%, 
the inflation rate i = .06 or 6%, and current land earnings is 
TABLE II 
THEORETICAL IMPACT OF VARIOUS 
VALUES OF i' ON LAND PRICE 
Expected rate of increases in: 















$100/acre. The results for each equation are summarized in Table II. 
This example shows that even if the expected real discount factor r is 
the same for all participants in the market, the land value can vary 
widely as a result of differences in expected land earnings trends. 
At the aggregate level, the variable i' cannot be observed but based 
on a previous theoretical framework it can be derived from anticipated 
nominal rate of earnings adjusted by inflation rate. If both 
anticipated nominal rate of earnings and inflation rate in land market 
are formed by their past values, the impact of i' value on farmland 
price can be calculated. Note that expected inflation impacts land 
value through i' and r for all situations, hence in theory expected 
inflation per se should not influence land value. 
Another essential parameter for this concept is the anticipated 
or desired real discount factor r. However, at the aggregate level 
the value r cannot be observed directly. The value differs among 
participants in the market. It is determined in the long run by the 
discount rate on future versus present consumption by the marginal 
efficiency of capital and by the marginal utility of income factors 
which change slowly over time. The market rate is the result of a 
bidding process between farmland buyers and sellers. The discount 
rate may be influenced by the opportunity cost of investment and the 
cost of obtaining funds for investment. Thus r is assumed to be 
influenced by the real rate of return on common stock (CGD), real 
average interest on farm loans (RIRG), real rate of return on 
long-term government bonds (RG2), proportion of loans made by Federal 
Land Banks (F) to total debts, and proportion of loans made by the 
Farmers Home Administration (FHA).· The variables F and FHA impact the 
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discount rate through low interest rate loans and other concessional 
credit terms. 
A theoretical framework derived previously suggests that the 
value of farmland depends on parameters R, r, and i' in all cases. 
The farmland value, therefore, can be written as a reduced form 
function of variables which influence these parameters: 
V = f(R, i', CGD, RIRG, RG2, F, FHA) (5) 
where variables 1n the model are previously defined. Other factors 
such as expected capital gains, expected inflation, urbanization, and 
income tax system may influence farmland price according to past 
studies (Reynold and Timmons, 1969; Duncan, 1979; Klinefelter, 1973). 
To introduce these factors in a farmland model, it is necessary to 
modify the capitalization formula in equation (1). As shown by 
equation (2), under strict assumptions farmland price is related to 
rent by a constant. It follows that if farmland rent is increasing at 
a rate 1 + i', then land price nominal capital gain rate i and real 
capital gain rate i' are driven by land earnings. If investors expect 
capital gains in excess of· rate i + i' normal for a well functioning 
market, then such speculative capital gain may drive land price 
irrespective of land earnings. Assume that farmland price 1s 
determined by the .summation of present value of land earnings and 
speculative capital gains. In other words, participants in farmland 
market consider both earnings and speculative windfall gains from 
price increases as factors to make their investment decision. The 
farmland price in equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
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t = 00 t = 00 
f R0e 
(i + i I )t 
J 
G (i + j )t 
dt + oe dt (6) vo kt kt 
e e 
t = 0 t = 0 
where J 1s the expected rate of increases in speculative capital 
gains, G0 is current period speculative capital gains and other' 
variables are as defined earlier. 
Speculative capital gains are not easily measured. To 
differentiate between increases in land prices caused by land earnings 
and by speculative capital gains, the expected relationship between 
land earnings and price needs to be identified. If expected land 
. . d (Rt) . (i + i 1 )t d . 1 d . earn1.ngs at per1.o t J.s R0e , an g1.ven an earn1.ngs 
and price are proportional as apparent in equation (2), then the price 
of land at period t (Pt*) increases at a rate i + i I as shown below, 
Pt* 
(i + i I )t = P e 
0 
where Pt* = expected price due to increases in land earning at period 
t. If 1 and value increases as a rate in excess of i + i 1 , because of 
a speculative element in land price determination, then speculative 
capital gains (SG) can be approximated by using Pt- Pt* where Pt is 
an observed price at period t. Therefore, equation (6) can be solved 
and written as: 
(7) 
where J is considered to be the expectation of the real rate of 
increase in speculative capital gains in farmland market. This 
parameter needs to be measured after adjusting for expected increases 
in land demand due to population pressure (urbanization) and other 
factors, some of which interact with the parameters in (7). 
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One interaction factor is the income tax rate. Higher tax rates 
on ordinary income will enhance the value of farmland if it is 
perceived to be a source of capital gain taxed at lower rates than 
ordinary income. The effect of income tax rate on farmland price 
through capital gains was shown in Tweeten (1981). Assume real rate 
of return on farmland and bonds (r) are the same. Let the marginal 
tax rate on current earnings be T and capital gains be taxed at .4T. 
Let land earnings increase at the inflation rate. The tax on income 
from land TL can be differentiated into two parts; current land 
earnings and capital gains. The total tax is, 
TLt = TRt{l + 0.4(i/r)}. 
Therefore, the tax rate (rLt) is TLt/PLt' where rLt = T(r + 
.4i) and Rt/PLt = r. The tax rate on a bond (r'Bt), however, is 
T'Bt/PBt which is equal to T(r + i). This example shows that the 
tax rate on a bond is higher than on farmland by rBt - rLt = n = 
0.6Ti, where 0.6 is 1.0 minus the marginal tax rate on current 
earnings (0.4). If capital gains are taxed at the same rate as 
earnings, the value of n will disappear. The excess tax rate on a 
bond is high when the marginal tax rate on current earnings and the 
inflation rate are high. A high excess tax rate on bonds makes land 
more attractive to investors, thus more land is demanded. Because T 
and i in£ luence the excess tax rate on a bond, their interaction with 
the inflation rate should affect the value of farmland. Given that 
parameters SG, j, and rare part of equation (7), the reduced form of 
the farmland price relationship can be shown as: 




X = tax rate on highest income, 
SG = speculative capital gains, 
CIGD = expected inflation rate, 
POP =population density, 
T time trend, 
XCIGD = X * CIGD. 
The time trend T is introduced to capture the impact of gradually 
changing factors such as changing preferences for income now versus 
later and for the intrinsic value investors place on farmland. In 
function (5) and (8) cash rent is used to represent land earnings. 
Cash rent can be expected to include benefits of farm commodity 
programs, economies of size and other variables affecting land 
earnings for agricultural uses. However, some past studies 
-(Klinefe_lter, 1973; Sandrey et al., 1982; Pope et al., 1979; etc.) 
suggested that farm income is also an important factor to explain farm 
land price variation. Therefore, the study will use farm 1ncome as an 
alternative to farm earnings in selected equations explaining land 
price. Gave rnme n t payments are included in farm income. When net 
cash rent is replaced by net farm income, the relationship can be 
rewritten as, 
V = f(RI, i', CGD, RIRG, RG2, F, FHA, POP, 
XCIGD, CIGD, SG, T) (9) 
where RI =net farm income. 
22 
Modification of Land Price Model 
In the previous sections, the land pr1ce model was developed by 
using price as a dependent variable. Alternatively, the cash rent to 
land price ratio will be used as the dependent Yariable. 
The concept of -using the rent-land price ratio to investigate 
land market is not new. For example, 1n 1924 Chamber used 
cross-sectional and inter-temporal comparison ratios of cash rent to 
farmland values to investigate land market behavior. Buechel (1924) 
also used the rent-value ratio in his article entitled "The Relation 
Between Rents and Agricultural Land Values in Theory and in Practice". 
The USDA also published this ratio for selected states in the Farm 
Real Estate Situation until the publication ceased in 1949 (Walker, 
1979). However, this ratio has reappeared in recent publications. 
Walker (1979), usmg data for 13 north-central states, found that the 
average ratio of net rent to land value rose slightly from the 
1921-1949 time period to the 1970s but the relationship had remained 
remarkably stable throughout 1921-1979. He found that the rate of 
return on farmland investment tended to be slightly higher in less 
populated states, suggesting that urban population contributed to 
higher land prices. 
In 1982, Gertel, using cash rent to measure rate of return on 
farmland, concluded that cash rent on farmland had outperformed common 
stocks over the long term. Doll and Widdows (1982) calculated and 
compared the value of cash rents to land values for selected farming 
regions. They concluded that the combined returns from agricultural 
gross cash rents and real capital gains suggest that returns from real 
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estate compared favorably to returns from other investments from 1960 
to 1979. 
The ratio of cash rent to land price will also be used in this 
study by modifying the farmland price model 1n the previous section. 
From equation (1), it was shown that V = R/(r- i'); this relationship 
can be rewritten as: 
R/V = r - i'. (10) 
Given that the value of rand i' are influenced by the variables 
previously defined, the variable R/V can also be a function of those 
variables: 
R/V = f(i', CGD, RIRG, RG2, f, FHA, POP, XCIGD, CIGD, SG, T). 
(11) 
Using the ratio of cash rent to land price as a dependent 
variable has an advantage over using price alone because it avoids the 
direction of causality problem that might occur between price and cash 
rent. Having cash rent on the left hand side of equation also reduces 
multicollinearity problems between rent and other independent 
variables such as expected future earnings. A disadvantage of this 
procedure is that it cannot directly be used to predict or explain 
farmland price variation. 
Elaboration on Variables Influencing 
Farmland Values 
As indicated earlier, numerous variables affect farmland values. 
These variables range from farm income to the growth rate of money 
supply. For quantitative analysis, it is useful to reduce the number 
of variables to be considered to a few of the more important. 
Ideally, variables involved must be consistent with economic theory 
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and availability of data. Statistical relationships among the 
variables considered also constrain the data. For example, if 
explanatory variables are too closely related, it may be necessary 1n 
the statistical analysis to let one serve as a proxy variable 
explaining its own effect as well as the effect of the others. 
Utilizing only the important variables will simplify the analysis and 
interpretation of the results, 
Each of several prominent variables which may influence land 
value receives some elaboration 1n the following section. The 
variables include rent (or farm income), capital gain, inflation, 
alternative investment opportunities, interest on farm mortgage loans, 
government payments, concessional credit by financial institutions, 
population pressure, and income tax structure. 
Rent 
Farm income was frequently used to measure returns to land in the 
studies reviewed earlier. Farm income, however, may not be a reliable 
estimate of the return to land, It measures returns to operator and 
family labor, management and equity capital. Over time it does not 
necessarily reflect changes in land characteristics such as 
productivity, return to scale, or rate of substitution of land for 
other inputs. Rent would appear to be a better measure of the return 
to land. 
The term "rent" has a specialized meaning for economists even 
though it is a common word. Generally, rent means a payment made to 
property owners for the use of their land and buildings. However, 
rent in economic terms can be divided into three concepts: contract 
rent, land rent (Ricardian rent), and economic rent (Barlowe, 1978). 
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The concept of contract rent ~s synonymous with the general 
meaning of rent. This term refers to the actual payments tenants make 
for their use of the property of others. The amount of these payments 
is normally agreed to by the landlord and tenant in advance of the 
period of property use and thus stems from mutual contractual 
arrangements. Therefore, rent in this concept can be considered as 
the expected income to be derived from farmland. 
In theory, land rent represents the actual earnings of land 
resources and may be defined simply as the economic return that 
accrues or should accrue to land for its use. This concept applies to 
the combined earnings of land sites and improvements. Ricardian rent 
is a specialized economic concept. As stated by Malthus (Ely and 
Wehrwein, 1941, p. 117): 
The rent of land may be defined to be that portion of the 
value of the whole produce which remains to the owner of the 
land, after all the outgoings belonging to its cultivation, 
of whatever kind, have been paid, including the profits of 
the capital employed, estimated according to the usual and 
ordinary rate of the profits of agricultural capital at the 
time being. 
Rent defined above as the excess value of the whole produce above 
what is necessary to pay the wages of labor and the profits of capital 
employed in cultivation differences from the concept of econom~c rent. 
Economic rent can be viewed as a short-run economic surplus that an 
operator can earn because of his/her clever foresight or unexpected 
demand and supply conditions (Leftwich and Eckert, 1982). Over longer 
time periods, the supply and demand for the goods and resources in 
question come into balance, and the economic rent disappears in a 
competitive market. 
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A short run cost-price diagram at the firm level helps to make 
c 1 ear the concept of economic rent. Figure 1 shows short-run average 
cost, average varfable cost, and marginal cost curves. Suppose that 
the market price of the product is P; the firm output will beY. 
Total cost of the variable resources is OVAY. This is the outlay 
necessary if the firm is to hold its variable resources. The fixed 
resources get whatever is left from the firm's total receipts; that 
is, they receive economic rent. Total rent for the fixed resources is 
VPBA. Economic rent may be equal to, greater than, or less than 
enough to cover the firm's fixed costs. When economic rent equals 
total firm fixed costs, the firm's pure profits are zero. 
The concept of economic rent is a different concept from the 
theory of rent explained by Ricado (1817). In his theory of rent, 
Ricado was concerned almost entirely with the problem of agricultural 
rents (Barlowe, 1978). He argued that only the mos't fertile lands 
would be brought into cultivation and that no payment of rent would be 
associated with their use. Rents arise on these lands only when 
increases in popu 1 at ion numbers and in the demand for land make it 
necessary for society to bring less fertile lands into use. Before 
the less fertile land will be utilized, product prices much 1.ncrease 
enough to cover the higher unit production costs encountered on these 
lands, Once prices rise to this level, the extensive margin of 
cultivation shifts to less fertile lands and these lands become 
available for economic use. At the same time, additional units of 
product from more fertile lands will be induced by the higher product 
price. The value of additional units accrues on prior units as an 
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Figure 1. Short-Run Cost Price Diagram 
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continued production, goes as rent to the owners of more fertile 
lands. 
market. 
Rents in this concept continue to exist even in a competitive 
From the previous definitions of rent, it is important to note 
that land rent and contract rent differ from each other ~n one 
significant respect. Contract rent involves an actual payment to the 
property owner. Contract rent has an element of expectations which 
may not measure true land earnings in a given year. This payment may 
either exceed or fall below the amount actually earned by the 
property. 
This study considered rent as the income of land owners. Rent in 
this context corresponds to contract rent. In theory, land resources 
have a current market value equal to the present value of their 
expected future rents or returns. Determinations of current values 
call for estimates of the expected future flow of land rent and for 
calculations of the present value of those rental returns which will 
not be realized until specified times in the future. 
Net Farm Income 
Although rent may be a preferred measure of returns to land, the 
value of farmland has frequently been estimated from net farm income 
in past studies (Pope et al., 1979). At the regional level, net farm 
income plays an important role in determining farmland value 
(Klinefelter, 1973; Sandrey et al., 1982). Nationally, farmland value 
maintained a fairly stable relationship to net farm income from the 
mid-1920s to the mid-1950s. Since then and until the 1980s, however, 
farmland value 1ncreased at an increasingly rapid rate that 
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outstripped increases in net farm income as shown in Figure 2. One 
reason is that in an inflationary economy such as of the 1970s much of 
the return to land comes as capital gain rather than current earnings. 
Net farm income may be a useful proxy for land earnings in 
determining farmland value. Net farm income data alone do not account 
for historical land price variations over an extended period (Tweeten, 
1979) but alternative measures of returns to land such as cash rents 
also are frequently flawed by error in the data. This study will use 
net farm income as well as rent to explain the value of farmland. In 
part, net income is included to test empirically its ability compared 
to rent to acc.ount for changes in land prices. 
Capital Gains 
It has been hypothesized that rising farmland values have been an 
important source of income to landowners. The rising value of 
farmland is a capital g'ain rather than a direct income to the land 
owner. This capital gain is not realized until the farmland is sold. 
In the 1970s, capital gains in farmland were substantial and greater 
than net farm income (Plaxico and Kletke, 1979). The investors or 
land buyers view capital gain as a part of their income from owned 
land. Speculators might bid for land to realize future capital gains 
independent of earning capacity of ,land! 
Even though capital gains can be considered as a deferred income 
of 1 and buyers, this factor might influence the value of farmland, as 
stated by Tweeten: 
Capita 1 gains can be a self-generating mechanism underlying 
land price appreciation. A negative residual income to real 
estate from farm production need not necessarily concern the 
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82 
cover the purchase price plus operating losses and still 
leave a satisfactory return for risk and capital 0979, p. 
288). 
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With the exception of only three years since 1950, the holders of 
farm real estate in the aggregate have enjoyed capital appreciation of 
that asset. Furthermore, the annual rate of capital appreciation has 
been as high as 25.2 percent (Duncan, 1979). To test the hypothesis 
that capital gains influence farmland price, other things equal, the 
capital gains variable will be included in the model. Because capital 
gains may be the result of expected real or nominal increases in 
future land earnings from inflation and other sources, a framework was 
suggested in the previous section to disentangle the separate impacts. 
The capital gain in excess of that predicted by land earnings 
represents a speculative factor. A positive relationship is expected 
between the speculative element and farmland price. 
Inflation 
Inflation may influence the value of farmland indirectly by 
influencing land earnings and directly because investors view farmland 
as a hedge against inflation due to the interaction between inflation 
and tax rates (Feldstein, 1980). However, Tweeten stated that: 
The important point, however, is that the attractiveness of 
farmland investment is better judged by trends in land 
earnings than by national inflation rates (1981, p. 21). 
Martin and Heady (1982) tested Feldstein's hypothesis and 
concluded that it did not appear that inflationary expectations have 
had a major direct impact on the value of U.S. farm real estate. 
Nevertheless, they also reported that study at the regional or state 
leve 1 may be needed to support or refute their conclusion. Since the 
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impact of inflation on farmland value is still. inconclusive, this 
research will include the expected inflation factor in the study 
model. The positive relationship is expected between anticipated 
future inflation and farmland price. 
Alternative Investment Opportunities 
Land 1. s one component of an investment portfolio for investors. 
Rational investors will make investments to maximize their total net 
return over time. When returns are higher in agricultural investments 
than elsewhere, it is reasonable to expect asset prices in the farm 
sector to be bid up relative to prices of nonfarm assets. On the 
other hand, higher rates of return outside of agriculture would cause 
investors to shift out of agricultural investment. Stocks and bonds 
are examples of alternative investments. If either or both of these 
rates are equal or higher than the rate of return on farmland 
investment, investors may invest in these assets rather than in 
farmland. It is not possible to state whether rates of return need to 
be higher, lower, or equal for land versus other investments to 
provide comparable alternativeness to investors. Common stocks and 
government bonds are more liquid than farmland, but farmland has 
intrinsic value and special amenities that reward the investor. The 
real rate of return on common stock and real rate of return on 
long-term government bonds. are included to show rates of return on 
alternative investments. The hypothesis of negative relationship 
between returns on other investments and farmland value is assumed. 
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Interest on Farm Mortgage Loans 
The interest rate on farm mortgage loans is expected to influence 
the value of farmland. Generally, if the cost of obtaining a farm 
loan is low, it is easier for farmers and others to finance farmland 
purchases which pushes up the demand for farmland. A higher real 
interest rate on mortgages causes future rents to be discounted more 
heavily, reducing land price. The farmland price is assumed to be 
negatively related to farm mortgage interest rates. 
Government Payments on Farm Programs 
Government programs raising farm income in turn boost farmland 
price over time as stated by Tweeten: 
Control of the land resource has been used as a public 
instrument to raise farm prices and incomes. Output 
restrictions, coupled with an inelastic (except in the long 
run) demand for farm commodities, effectively raised farm 
income. Economic theory and observed behavior suggest that 
the monetary benefit of federal programs controlling land 
would be capitalized into land value over time (1979, p. 
287). 
Since 1960, government payments to farmers were more than one 
billion dollars annually except for the years 1974-1976, as indicated 
in Table III. The income maintenance aspects of government farm 
programs reduce the risk in farming, thus increasing the value of farm 
real estate. The benefits from government payment can be divided in 
two parts: 1) annual income from price supports or provisions to grow 
crops while the initial owner retains title and 2) the discounted 
value of all expected future earnings that will accrue from the 
support program through land ownership (Tweeten, 1979). However, the 
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be moderate because of uncertainty over the duration of such payments 
(Reinsel and Krenz, 1972). In spite of the uncertainty of government 
programs, such programs are usually recognized as having some impact 
on farmland value. This research, thus, will include government 
payments in· the study model. Because payments, diverted acres and 
other income enhancement provisions of programs are closely 
correlated, payments will be used as a proxy for overall commodity 
program impacts. The positive relationship to farmland price is 
expected for this variable. 
Concession Credit by Financial Institutions 
Federal Land Banks (cooperative institutions not charged federal 
corporate income taxes) and the Farmers Home Administration have 
played a major role in the farming business by offering interest rates 
for farm loans below those available from commercial lenders. Lower 
credit cost of owning farmland compared to other assets increases the 
demand for farmland. Table IV shows the amount of agricultural loans 
offered by these two agencies since 1950. Major increases are 
apparent in lending by both agencies. Although concessional lending 
has not been widely considered in past studies, the recent literature 
has mentioned the possible impact of this factor on farmland value 
(Tweeten, 1981). This study wi 11 test whether or not this factor 
influences the value of farmland. A positive relationship between 
land price and concessional lending activity is assumed. 
Population Pressure 
The growth of population expands demand for food, and hence for 
land. Also urban population pressure directly increases land demand 
Year 
TABLE IV 
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for residential, commercial, and industrial developments. The study 
by Crowley (1972) showed that land value in urban-influenced counties 
appreciated at a faster rate than in the non-urban grain growing 
areas. 
A proxy for population pressure is population density (Sandrey et 
al., 1982). This variable has been found to be superior to population 
number alone to represent population pressure. This variable is 
hypothesized to have a positive relationship with farmland value. 
Income Tax Structure 
It has been hypothesized that people buy farm real estate as a 
way to reduce their income tax. In other words, buying farmland can 
be considered as a tax shelter for high income people. For many 
part-time farmers, tax advantages are decisive in exercising their 
preference to reside on and operate a small farm. People in the 
highest income brackets gain the most from purchase of land as a tax 
shelter. Based on these assumptions, the tax rate for the highest 
income bracket will be used as a proxy to measure the influence of the 
tax system on land values. Furthermore, tax rate is assumed to 
interact with the inflation rate as indicated earlier. A positive 
relationship is expected between this variable and farmland pr1ce. 
Test of Structural Stability 
Ordinary least squares will be used to estimate the coefficients 
of independent variables for models specified 1n the previous 
sections. These models will allow for structural stability tests 
between the regions and between time periods. The test will be 
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appLied to both price and cash rent to land price models. The null 
hypothesis tested is: there is no difference in the structural 
coefficients across the regions. 
The mathematical derivation for this test can be briefly 
illustrated (see Chow, 1960 and Fisher, 1970). Let the two samples 
(regions) of n1 and n2 observations be represented by 
Y1 = Xlb1 + e1 and Y2 = X2b2 + e2 
where Y1 and Y2 are n1 x 1 and n2 x 1, X1 and X2 are n1 x k and n2 x 
k, respectively. If the null hypothesis is HO: b1 = b2. In the 
framework of testing linear restrictions Rb = r, the model can be 
written as: 
and the k restrictions as, 
Rb = [I - I]~~= 0 
the sum of squares e*'e* is obtained by regressing the n1 + n2 
observations of Yon X1 and X2 assuming that bl = b2. It has nl + n2 
- k degrees of freedom. The sum of squares e'e is obtained by the 
regression model without assuming bl = b2. It has nl + n2 - 2k degree 
of freedom. Thus, the null hypothesis bl = b2 is tested by using: 
F(k, n1 + n2- 2k) = ((e*'e*- e'e)/k)/(e'e/(nl + n2- 2k)) 
(16) 
If the value of calculated F from equation (16) is greater than the F 
v a 1 u e obtained from the F-tab le at appropriate degrees of freedom and 
level of significance, then the null hypothesis will be rejected and 
it will be concluded that there is a difference in structural 
coefficients among groups of data sets (regions or time periods). 
Testing Model Stability Under Differences 
In Expected Inflation 
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This section ~s the extension of the previous section. Again a 
dummy variable is applied to the models to test for the impact of 
anticipated inflation rates on land price. Under this scenario, the 
data will be separated into two subperiods: high and low expected 
inflation. The dummy variable equals one for high expected inflation 
and zero otherwise. Both slope and intercept in the model can be 
changed by expected inflation. The model under this scenario can be 
shown as following: 
where 
Y = aX1 + bD + CiZi + GiDZi (i = 2, 3, ••• k) 
Y dependent variable 
X1 = 1 
D = dummy variable (1 = high inflation rate, 0 otherwise) 
Zi = explanatory or independent variables 
a, b, Ci, and Gi = estimated parameters. 
The models for high and low expected inflation rate can be written as: 
Y = (a + b)X1 + (Ci + Gi)Zi and, 
Y aXL + CiZi, respectively. 
The null hypothesis is set as HO: b = Gi = 0. The Chow-test will be 
performed to test this hypothesis. The criteria for accepting or 
rejecting the hypothesis is the same as indicated in equation (16) in 
the previous section. If the null hypothesis ~s rejected, it means a 
degree of expected inflation influences farmland price behavior. 
The conceptual framework for this study has been discussed ~n 
this chapter. In addition, the past studies on farmland price were 
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reviewed and a series of hypotheses and tests also were stated. In 
the following chapter, the data used in this study will be presented. 
CHAPTER III 
DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present data needs and sources 
for this study. A most difficult task in econometric modeling is to 
identify which variables to include in the model. Generally, the most 
use fu 1 guide in such a search is economic theory (Kenedy, 1981). 
Chapter I I in this study pres en ted the conceptual framework for 
including variables in the econometric model. Some of the values for 
these variables can be obtained directly from secondary sources. 
Others need to be constructed. The procedure for constructing such 
variables is detailed in the following section. 
Variable Construction 
Anticipated Real Growth of Earnings (i') 
The value of. this variable is derived from the changes in land 
cash rent. In reality, there are many types of rents. Even under a 
given type of rent, such as share rent, the landlords and tenants 
share the farm production will vary among situations (Scott, Jr., 
1983). This study nevertheless, uses only cash rent because it is the 
only data available for most states. 
The percent changes in cash rent is computed by using the 
following formula; 
~R = (Rn- Rn_1 ) * 100/Rn_1 
41 
42 
where ~ is real net cash rent at period n. Real net cash rent is 
n 
net cash rent deflated by GNP deflator. 
Real Rate of Return on Common Stock (CGD) 
This variable is calculated by utilizing Standard and Poor's 
composite price index and dividend price ratio. The composite price 
index is used as a proxy to calculate the percent of capital gains or 
losses by investors. This percent gain or loss is added to a percent 
of common stock yield. The resulting variable is adjusted by the 
inflation rate to obtain the real rate of return on common stock. 
Inflation Rate (CIGD) 
The changes in the index of the GNP price deflator is chosen to 
represent the inflation rate as shown in a following formula: 
CIGD = (GNPD - GNPD 1 ) * 100/GNPD 1 • n n- n-
Share of Loans Made by Federal Land Bank 
Data on annual outstanding loans made by this agency are 
available for each state. However, annual total outstanding loans 
made are not available by state. Thus the total debt by state is used 
as a proxy for its value. The final variable is the ratio of loans 
made by Federal Land Banks to total debt. 
Share of Loan Made by Farmers Home Administration (FHA) 
This variable is not reported at the state level but is available 
at the national level. The variable is obtained by dividing total 
loans made by Farmers Home Administration by total agricultural loans. 
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Other Variables 
The remaining variables in the model do not need detailed 
elaboration because they were obtained directly from secondary sources 
or needed only minor adjustment. 
Data Sources 
The data used in this study are obtained from seconcfa.ry sources 
such as USDA publications, Economic Report of the President, etc. The 
secondary data and their sources are presented in the following 
section (see appendix ). 
1. Farm cash rents and farmland value are provided by USDA from 
unpublished worksheets. 
2. Taxes levied on farm real estate by state are obtained from 
Farm Real Estate Taxes, various issues (USDA, 1967, 1973, 1979, 1981). 
3. Population by state is collected from the Statistical 
Abstract of the U.S., (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1956, 1962, 1968, 
1972, 1983). 
4. Implicit price deflator for gross national product is from 
the Economic Report of the President 1983 (Council of Economic 
Adviser, 1983). 
5. Standard & Poor's Composite Index and dividend price ratio 
are obtained from the same source as (4). 
6. Average interest rates on farm loan are obtained from 
. Agricultural Statistics, various issues (USDA, 1952-1983). 
7. Rate of return on 10-year U.S. Treasury securities 1s 
collected from Banking and Monetary Statistics 1970 (Board of 
44 
Governorsof the Federal Reserve System, 1970), and Economic Report of 
the President 1983 (Council of Economic Adviser, 1983). 
8. Tax rate on highest income is collected from Statistics of 
Income, varJ.ous issues (U.S Department of Treasury, 1950-1953) and 
Statistics of Income: Individual Income Tax Returns, varJ.ous J.ssues 
(U.S. Department of Treasury, 1954-1982). 
9. Amount of loans made by Federal Land Banks by state, amount 
of loans made by Farmers Home Administration in the U.S., amount of 
total agricultural loans l.n the U.S., and area of land 'in farms by 
states are reported in Agricultural Statistics, various J.ssues (USDA, 
1952-1983). 
10. Government spending on farm programs and net farm income by 
state are collected from Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector, 
varJ.ous issues (USDA, 1984). 
In summary, this chapter showed sources of variables used in this 
study, In some cases, the value of variables could not be directly 
obtained from the secondary sources. The methodology to construct 
those variables was presented herein. The next chapter will utilize 
variables in this chapter to estimate the parameters in the 
econometric model. The econometric relationship also will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR FARMLAND PRICE AND 
RATIO OF RENT TO FARMLAND PRICE 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a background for the 
econometric model used in this study. Various econometric models will 
be discussed as well as the statistical and economic criteria used to 
determine the importance of estimated parameters in the model. 
Functional Relationship and Expectations 
In the previous chapter, the functional relationship of farmland 
price and rent-farmland price ratio to explanatory variables was 
illustrated. One explanatory variable is the expectation of future 
increases in real farmland earnings. This study assumes that 
expectations are formed from past values of increases in real 
earnings. The near-term value of increases in real earnings carries 
more weight than more distant ones. In other words, the impact of 
real earnings on farmland price continuously declines over a period of 
time. This relationship is illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The 
functional relationships can be written as: 
where 
Vt = f(it, it_ 1 , ••• ,it-n' other variables) 
vt = farmland value at period t and 
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Figure 3. The Possible Shapes of the Impact of 
Increase in Real Earnings on Land 
Price Over Time 
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Based on this reduced functional form, the distributed lag model .is 
appropriate to represent farmland price and the ratio of rent to 
farmland price. 
Elaboration of the Distributed Lag Model 
A distributed lag model can be expressed as 
t 
Vt = Ek=OBkXt-k + ut 
so that Vt is some weighted sum of past values of Xt and the 
weights Bk are some function of K, the lag period. The range of 
summation, t, may 'be finite or infinite. This mode 1 has proven to be 
useful in many econometric problems where several lagged values of a 
predetermined variable act on the current dependent variable. Many 
alternative specifications for Bk have been proposed for both 
finite and infinite lags. One of the examples of an infinite lag 
model is the geometric lag; 
which was introduced by Koyck ( 1954). Coefficients estimated by 
ordinary least squares are not statistically consistent and efficient 
unless the residua 1 follows a particular first order autoregressive 
scheme. A direct ordinary least squares estimate of the model often 
yields an excessively high value of o, thus giving an impression of a 
slowly decaying or long lag (Maddala, 1977). Solow (1960) proposed 
lag weights which follow a Pascal probability distribution as follows, 
Bk = (1 - o )r (r+~-1 )ok 
thus, 
The, e s t i m a t i o n p r o c e d u r e for this mode 1 must account for 
48 
nonlinearities to derive maximum likelihood estimates for o and 13. 
In addition, the problem will involve choosing the degree of r. 
Jorgenson (1966) suggested approximating the lag distribution by 
the ratio of two polynomials A(L)/B(L) in the lag operator L. This 
model is the class o-f rational infinite distributed lag functions. 
The models by Koyck and Solow are considered to be special cases of 
the rational distributed lag model. In this model, as in Koyck's, the 
ordinary least squares estimation is valid only if the residuals in 
the distributed lag model follow a special autoregressive process. 
Tsurumi ( 1971) proposed using the Gamma probability distribution for 
the distributed lag weight, that is 
13 = Bk8- 1e-k 
k 
where S = some constant value. This model also needs a search 
procedure to estimate parameters. 
In most situations the impact of explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable is spread over a finite time period. This calls 
for the finite distributed lag model. An example is the arithmetic 
lag model proposed by Fisher (1937). This model assumes that the lag 
coefficients a. decline arithmetically as shown below; 
l. 
13. = (K + 1 - i)l3, 0 < i < K 
l. 
= 0, i > K. 
DeLeeuw (1962, 1965) proposed weights following a finite inverted V 
shape, that is 
13i = iB, 0 ~ i ~ k/2 
= (k - i)B, k/2 ~ i < k. 
Almon (1965) suggested that a finite number of lag weights follow a 
low order polynomial. The value of B. can be illustrated as: 
l. 
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where k = degree of polynomial. In his work, Almon proposed the 
endpoint constraint such that !3_ 1 = 13k+l = 0. This restriction 
later was relaxed by Bischoff (1966) and by Modigliani and Sut~h 
(19 6 6). Hall and Sutch (1968) proposed extending the Almon model with 
lag weights that first follow the finite polynomial scheme and then 
after a smooth transition follow the infinite geometric shape. 
The Choice of Distributed Lag Models 
As previously indicated, many types of distributed lag models are 
available. To choose a suitable one, information and assumptions from 
a theoretical framework are needed. In this study, price and the net 
rent-farmland price ratio are assumed to be a function of expected 
increases in real earnings and other relevant variables. Expectations 
of increases in real earnings are assumed to be formed from a finite 
number of its past values. This scenarLo limits the model to a finite 
distributed lag. 
Within the class of finite distributed lag models, the polynomial 
distributed lag gives more flexibility to the lag coefficients than do 
other models. The lag coefficients depict a decaying effect of real 
earnings increments. The polynomial lag model does not utilize the 
lagged dependent variable as an independent variable, hence the 
estimated coefficients may be consistent under OLS. Therefore, the 
polynomial distributed lag model is chosen for this study. 
The polynomial distributed lag model necessitates choosing the 
degree of polynomial and the lag length. A larger degree provides 
more flexibility, but reduces degrees of freedom. A polynomial of 
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degree 2 or 3 usually provides a sufficiently accurate approximation 
to the lag structure (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). 
The 1 ag length also poses problems. A pr1or1 knowledge about the 
lag length would be useful but usually is inadequate. The lag length 
can be parametrically changed to obtain the most suitable model 
structure based on minimizing error or other criteria. 
Model Estimation 
This study assumes a declining lag weight for increases in real 
earnings that can be approximated by a second degree polynomial. In 
addition, end point restriction are imposed. The estimated model can 
be illustrated as follows: 
and 
where 
A. =other relevant variables in the model, 
1t 
Xt = increases in real earnings at period t. 




a 2 (k + 1) = 0 
2 a 0 = -a1(k + 1)- a 2(k + 1) . 
From equation (1) and (2), 
where 
.,.k .,.k . d z0t = w._0xt ., z1t = w. 01X . , an z2t 1- -1 1= t-1 
Substituting equation (4) into (5) yields (9) 
k .2 











The value of a.1 , a.2 , and d 1 can be estimated by OLS; a. 0 
is obtained by substituting a.1 and a. 2 in (4). Finally, the value 
Bi are found by substituting a. 0 , a. 1 , and a. 2 into (2). 
This study will start with the full model for both price and 
rent-farmland price ratio. The pooled cross-section (state data) and 
time-series data are used to estimate model coefficients. Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (1981) indicated that pooling data is an acceptable 
procedure when time series related explanatory variables such as 
expectations, prices, and interest rates appear in the model. 
However, this method assumes that cross-section parameters do not 
shift over time. 
Based on the conceptual framework in Chapter II, 6 models are to 
be estimated: 
RAt = f ("I • I 4 1 t'"""' 1 t-n' RIRG, FHA, F, POP, CIGD, XCIGD, SG, T) 
RAt = f ("I • I 5 1 t'"""' 1 t-n' CGD, FHA, F, POP, CIGD, XCIGD, SG, T) 
RAt = f ("I • I 6 1 t'"""' 1 t-n' RG2, FHA, F, POP, CIGD, XCIGD, SG, T) 
vt = f ("I • I 1 1 t'"""' 1 t-n' RIRG, FHA, F, POP, CIGD, XCIGD, R, SG, T) 
vt = f ("I • I 2 1 t'"""' 1 t-n' CGD, FHA, F, POP, CIGD, XCIGD, R, SG, T) 
vt = f ("I • I 3 1 t'"""' 1 t-n' RG2, FHA, F, POP, CIGD, XCIGD, R, SG, T) 
where all variables were defined earlier in Chapter II. The second 
degree polynomial lag model was estimated with 5' 10, and 15 year 
lags. The estimated coefficients for each model are shown in Tables V 
and VI. Note that there are 3 equations for both the price and 
rent-land price models because there are 3 alternative variables used 
io i1 
R\ -0.0000082 -o.000043 
t-Va1ue -0.006 -o.033 
RAt -0.0000078 -o.000023 
t-Va1ue -0.006 -0.018 
RAt -0.0000075 -o.000013 
t-Value -0.005 -o .009 
RAt -0.000011 0.000060 
t-Va1ue -0.006 0.034 
RAt -0.000011 0.000066 
t-Va1ue -0.006 0.040 
RAt -0.000017 0.000070 
t-Value -0.009 0.040 
RAt -0.000012 0.000052 
t-Va1ue -0.005 0.020 
RAt -0.000013 0.000056 
t-Value -0.006 0.020 
RAt -0.00001 0.000060 
t-Value -0.006 0.030 
TABLE V 
THE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE RATIO OF 
RENT TO FARMLAND PRICE BY USING SECOND 
DEGREE POLYNOMINAL LAG 
i2 i3 i4 is i6 i7 is 
-0.000059 -0.000057 -0.000037 
-0.044 -0.040 -0.024 
-0.00003 -o.000029 -0.000018 
-0.023 -0.020 -0.120 
-0.000014 -0.000013 -o .00008 
-0.011 -0.009 -0.005 
0.00012 0.00015 0.00018 0.00019 0.00018 0.00016 0.00012 
0.064 0.085 0.097 0.099 0.092 0.077 0.055 
0.00013 0.00017 0.00019 0.00021 0. 00020 0.00017 0.00013 
0.071 0.094 0.110 0.110 0.100 0.080 0.060 
0.00014 0.00019 0.00022 0.00023 0.00022 0,00019 0.00015 
0.080 0.100 0.120 0.120 0.110 0.090 0.060 
0.00010 0.00015 0.00019 0.00022 0.00023 0.00024 0.00024 
0.050 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.100 
0.00012 0.00016 0.00021 0.00024 0.00025 0.00026 0.00027 
0.050 0.070 0.090 0.100 0.110 0.110 0.110 
0.00013 0.00019 0.00024 0.00027 0.00029 0.00031 0.00031 






























TABLE V (Continued) 
i13 i14 RIRG CGD RG2 FHA F POP CIGD 
RAt 0. 378 1.822 -1.666 -4.5 21 o. 231 
t-Va1ue 2.650 0.960 -1.700 -9.130 1. 360 
RA 0.0019 1.120 -1.980 -4.480 0.015 t 
t-Value o. 900 0.595 -2.040 -8.870 0.110 
RAt -0.032 o. 314 -2.090 -4.489 -0.060 
t-Va1ue -0.632 0.155 -2.110 -8.890 -0.431 
RAt 0. 243 1.866 -1.148 -4.460 0. 235 
t-Value 1.649 1.023 -1.233 -9.335 1.519 
RAt 0.004 2.175 -1.164 -4.480 0.168 
t-Va1ue 1.608 1.165 -1.250 -9.390 l. 256 
RA -0.050 0.628 
t 
-1.431 -4.480 0.027 
t-Va1ue -1.036 0. 324 -1.516 -9.410 0. 205 
R\ 0.00012 0.00006 0.246 3.026 -1.050 -4.748 o. 211 
t-Va1ue 0.040 0.020 1.406 1.423 -1.143 -10.568 1. 330 
RAt 0.00012 0.00006 0.003 2. 377 -1.014 -4.742 0.154 
t-Va1ue 0.040 0.020 l. 301 1.144 -1.100 -10.523 1.115 
RA 0.00014 
t 
0.00007 -0.050 1.542 -1.286 -4.745 0.017 
t-Va1ue 0.050 0.020 -1.026 0.689 -1.374 -10.538 0.134 
XCIGD SG 
0.00200 -0.00002 
1. 320 -0.180 
-0.00009 -0.00002 
-0.054 -0. 216 
0.00048 -0.00003 
0. 302 -0.311 
0.00009 o. 00003 
0.056 0. 277 
-0.00220 0.00004 


















-0.15 3 0.414 
-9.120 
-o .125 0.413 
-4.802 
-o. 214 0. 4;352 
-5.194 
-o .170 0.4345 
-9.433 
-0.137 0. 4341 
-4.836 






















THE ESTI~~TED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE 
FARMLAND PRICE BY USING SECOND 
DEGREE POLYNOMIAL LAG 
io i1 i2 i3 i4 is i6 i7 is i9 i10 ill i12 i13 i14 
vt 0.0011 -o.030 -0.045 -o.046 -0.030 
t-Va1ue 0.007 -0.199 -0.293 -o. 276 -0.166 
vt 0.0012 -0.027 -0.041 -0.041 -0.028 
t-Va1ue 0.007 -0.180 -0.260 -o.250 -0.150 
vt 0.0010 -0.030 -0.046 -o.046 -0.031 
t-Va1ue 0.006 -o. 200 -0.300 -o. 2so -0.170 
vt 0.0026 -0.016 -0.031 -0.041 -0.048 -0.050 -o.048 -0.042 -o.032 -o.018 
t-Va1ue 0.010 -0.067 -0.127 -0.169 -0.191 -0.194 -0.181 -0.151 -o.109 -0.058 
vt 0.0025 -0.015 -0.029 -0.039 -0.046 -0.048 -0.046 -0.040 -0.031 -0.017 
t-Va1ue 0.010 -0.064 -0.122 -o.161 -0.183 -o.186 -0.173 -0.145 -o.105 -0.055 
vt 0.0026 -0.018 -0.035 -0.047 -0.054 -0.05 7 -0.055 -0.048 -0.037 -0.021 
t-Va1ue 0.010 -0.078 -0.146 -0.193 -0.218 -0.223 -o. 206 -0.173 -o.125 -0.066 
vt 0.0029 -0.016 -0.033 -0.047 -0.059 -0.067 -0.073 -0.076 -0.076 -0.074 -o.068 -0.060 -o.049 -o. 035 -0.019 
t-Va1ue 0.008 -0.049 -0.098 -0.139 -0.171 -o.194 -0.207 -0.212 -o. 208 -o.196 -0.176 -o.150 -o.us -o.082 -o.042 
vt 0.0028 -0.016 -0.032 -0.046 -0.05 7 -0.066 -0.071 -0.074 -0.074 -0.072 -0.067 -0.059 -o.048 -o.034 -0.018 
t-Va1ue 0.008 -0.048 -0.096 -o .136 -0.167 -0.189 -0.202 -0.207 -0.203 -0.191 -o.172 -o.146 -o.l15 -o .080 -0.041 
vt 0.003 -o .019 -0.038 -0.054 -0.067 -0.07 7 -0.083 -0.087 -0.087 -0.084 -o.078 -0.068 -0.056 -0.040 -0.021 




RIRG CGD RG2 FHA F POP 
vt 41. 399 -439.990 178.947 1058.930 
t-Va1ue 2.406 -2.010 1.577 17.631 
vt 0.095 -545.600 143.940 1064.270 
t-Value 0. 379 -2.486 1.289 17.810 
vt 22.425 -187.050 228.630 105 3. 220 
t-Va1ue 3.818 -0.798 1. 998 17.863 
vt 18.322 -465 .490 131.920 1099.270 
t-Va1ue 0. 883 -1.885 1.047 17.020 
v 0.162 -475.450 126.300 1095.900 t 
t-Va1ue 0.476 -1.879 1.001 17.147 
vt 22.126 -171.930 197. 270 1100.530 
t-Value 3. 370 -0.660 1.558 17.113 
v 
t 
19.230 -311.970 181 .116 1195.420 
t-Va1ue 0.707 -0.95 3 1. 280 17. 208 
vt 0. 239 -363.930 182.5 30 1195.6 70 
t-Va1ue 0.562 -1.138 1.286 17.253 
vt 19.450 -29.200 246.290 1196.370 
t-Va1ue 2.603 -o .080 1. 726 17.166 
(Continued) 
CIGD XCIGD R SG 
20.090 o. 386 13.672 0.019 
1.088 1.877 21.181 7.562 
-4.119 0.146 14.087 0.106 
-0.25 9 0.755 22.440 7. 351 
18.675 0.059 13.938 0.111 
1.151 0. 317 22. 320 7. 722 
-5.126 . 0.394 13.998 0.113 
-0. 242 1.659 19.702 6. 925 
-13.259 0. 255 14.157 0.113 
-0.730 1.150 20.447 6.897 
7.010 0.198 14.020 0.116 
o. 390 o. 952 20.350 7.188 
-1.348 o. 362 14.481 0.119 
-0.055 1. 240 18.631 6.500 
-6.760 0.178 14.565 0.119 
-0. 316 0.679 18.950 6.550 
7.946 0.166 14.488 0.122 


















26.243 0. 8030 
5.875 






















to measure opportunity cost: real average interest rate on farm 
mortgage loans, real rate of return on common stock, and real rate of 
return on long-term government bonds. 
Equation (10) to (18) show the regressions of net cash 
rent-farmland price ratio on explanatory variables. 2 The R ranges 
from 0.3948 (equation 12) to 0.4352 (equation 16). Coefficients of 
real earnings increments (i 1 ) in several cases do not have the 
expected sign and t-values are low. In addition, the shape of the lag 
coefficients does not always follow the hypothesized pattern. The 
shapes of distributed lag are shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6 for 5, 10, 
and 15 year lags respectively. Each figure shows the pattern of lag 
coefficient when using variables RIRG, CGD, and RG2. Note that all 5 
year lag coefficients have the expected negative signs. Coefficients 
are positive for 10 and 15 year lag models. 
The farmland price model, equation (19) to (27) from Table VI, 
has the same explanatory variables as the previous model (ratio model) 
plus the net cash rent variable. The R2 for this model ranges from 
0.8020 to 0.8067. Similar to the ratio model, the coefficients of the 
real rate of increase in farmland earnings (i 1 ) do not have the 
expected sign and has low t-values in all the models. The plot of lag 
coefficients also does not show a reasonable pattern as shown in 
Figures 7, 8, and 9. 
Equations (10) to (27) indicate that i 1 does not perform very 
well in both the price and ratio models. Several regression 
coefficients link the predetermined i 1 to the dependent variable. An 
F-test of the joint hypothesis HO: a1 = a2 = ••• = f3k = 0 1.s 
the appropriate test of whether i 1 makes a significant contribution to 
--· ~~~:.'!' " ilel' q~;' ~.:.'!' n~;11 ~:i. .l . . . ..... 
n~j' l. : . .1: 
Figure 4. Shapes of the Lag Coefficients in the Ratio 
Model Using 5 Year Second Degree 
Polynomial Lags for the Variables RG2, 
CGD, and RIRG 
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.:~. 
Figure 5. Shapes of the Lag Coefficients in the Ratio 
Model Using 10 Year Second Degree 
Polynomial Lags for Variables RG2, CGD, 
and RIRG 
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Figure 6. Shapes of the Lag Coefficients in the Ratio 
Model Using 15 Year Second Degree 





· · · 1!;!31 , lh~l :IL 
Figure 7. 
.:tl.. 
Shapes of the Lag Coefficients in the Price 
Model Using 5 Year Second Degree 
Polynomial Lags for Variables RG2, CGD, 
and RIRG 
60 
Figure 8. Shapes of the Lag Coefficients in the Price 
Model Using 10 Year Second Degree 
Polynomial Lags for Variables RG2, CGD, 
and RIRG 
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Figure 9. 
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Shapes of the Lag Coefficients in the Price 
Model Using 15 Year Second Degree 




the regression. The test statistic is, 
F(K, T-N) = {(ESSR- ESSU)/ESSU}(T-N)/K 
where ESSR is the error sum of square for the restricted regression 
which forces 13 1 = 13 2 = = 13k = 0. ESSU 1s unconstrained 
error sum of squares. T is the number of observations, N is the 
number of predetermined variables in the unconstrained regression and 
K is the number of constraints imposed by the hypothesis. Tables VII 
and VI I I show that the hypothesis of lag coefficients equal· to zero 
cannot be rejected because the calculated F-values are less than the 
tabular F-values. 
Based on the F-test, t-tests, and the sign and shape of lag 
coefficients i', it is concluded that i' does not play a significant 
role on this model. This result is the same as that arrived at by 
Martin and Heady ( 1982). They were unable to establish a positive 
relationship between expected growth rate in real returns and real 
estate values. Their study, however, assumed that expected growth 
rates were formed adaptively. The variable i' is dropped from the 
model. A majority of farmland participants might consider increases 
in real earnings too nebulous or unpredictable a factor in making a 
decision to buy farmland and merely assume i' = 0. Real earnings 
increments appear to be heavily discounted by farmland market 
participants in making investment decisions. 
The estimated coefficients for models without i' are shown 1n 
Table IX. Equations (28) to (30) show models for the ratio of rent to 
farmland price. 
2 The R for these 3 equations ranges from 0.3251 to 
0.3352. The estimated coefficients for the price model are shown in 
equations (31) to (33). The value of R2 for these equations ranges 












CALCULATED F-VALUE FOR IMPOSED RESTRICTION 

































CALCULATED F-VALUE FOR IMPOSED RESTRICTION 























THE ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE RATIO OF RENT 
TO FARMLAND PRICE AND FARHLAND PRICE MODELS 
Equation Intercept RIRG CGD RG2 FHA F POP CIGD XCIGD 
RA (28) 14.689 o. 417 1. 9331 -o. 980 -4.544 0.192 0.0029 
t-value 15.940 2.827 0.937 -1.909 -8.881 1.181 1.559 
RA (29) 13.518 0.001 0. 905 2 -1.335 -4.443 -0.027 0.0003 
t-va1ue 16.402 0.606 0.444 -1.245 -8. 355 -0.190 0.178 
RA ( 30) 12.568 -o. o5 3 -0.140 -1.499 -4.443 -0.104 0.0007 
t-va1ue 10.318 -0.977 -0.063 -1.377 -8.342 -0:707 0.437 
v ( 31) -1120.208 45.316 -381.299 203.887 1056.700 35.448 0. 2360 
t-va1ue -11.984 2.924 -1.884 1. 925 18.450 1.151 2. 259 
v (32) -1222.270 0.148 -500.739 164.581 1029.331 11.294 -0.0508 
t-va1ue -14.298 0.684 -2.469 1.546 18.641 o. 793 -0.293 
v (33) -815.440 25 .512 -88.450 258.158 1054.113 34.007 -0.1166 
t-va1ue -6.685 4.760 -o.411 2.429 18.588 2. 345 -0.699 
SG T 
0.00010 -o .165 
1.049 -6.743 
0.00015 -0.109 
1.119 -7.85 8 
-0.00016 -o.090 
-1.266 -3.905 














o. 335 2 
0. 3251 







Based on Table IX, the equation that contains the real rate of 
interest on farm mortgage loans (RIRG) performs better than the 
equations containing the real rate of return on common stock (CGD) or 
rea 1 rate of return on long-term government bonds (RG2). Thus, the 
real average interest rate on farm loans is chosen to represent the 
opportunity cost for farmland investment in subsequent analysis. This 
reduces the estimated models (price and ratio) to only two equations, 
(28) and (31). The coefficients of variables FHA and SG are not 
statistically different from zero in (28), and have unexpected signs. 
Hence, these variables are eliminated from the model. The correlation 
coefficient between variables CIGD and XCIGD indicates a high degree 
of mu 1 tic o 11 i near it y. The mean -squares error criterion is used for 
selecting variables to be included in the models (Maddala, 1977 and 
Kennedy, 1984). Thus, only the variable XCIGD is used subsequently to 
represent the effect of both inflation and tax rate. The estimat-ed 
model is reduced to 
RA = f(RIRG, F, POP, XCIGD, T) 
and 
V = f(RIRG, F, POP, XCIGD, R, T). 
The least squares estimates of these two functions are shown in Table 
X. The estimated equations (34) and (35) used pooled state and 
time-series data to obtain a unique set of explanatory variables for 
each state. 
Equation (34) and (35) are estimated by using OLS and adjusted 
for autocorrelation by applying the Cochrane-Orcutt method. The 
coefficient of determination, R2 , for the ratio model is 0.3279 and 
F-test indicates that the composite hypothesis B1 = B2 
Equation Intercept 
RA (34) 13.62 7 
t-va1ue 32.689 
v ( 35) -1237.617 
t-va1ue -23.799 
TABLE X 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR THE RATIO OF 
RENT TO LAND PRICE AND PRICE MODELS 
RIRG F POP XCIGD R 
0.307 -1.329 -4.396 0.0039 
2.477 -1.283 -8.308 2.391 
27.235 185.543 1054.800 0.4315 14.216 














= 0 l.S rejected. The t-values for all coefficients are 
significant at the 10 percent level except for the variable F. In the 
price model, t-values for all of the coefficients are significant at 
the 10 percent level. The coefficient of real rate of interest, 
however, does not show expected sign. In addition, the composite 
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero is also rejected. 
The R2 for the price model is 0.79. 
Estimates for each state for the ratio and price models are shown 
in Tables XI and XII, respectively. In the ratio model, the R2 
ranges from 0.36 for Indiana to 0.97 for South Carolina. The 
coefficient signs in some states are different from those for the 
pooled data. Because equations for 35 states were estimated, 
explanations for each state would be too lengthy. 
explanation of the coefficients will be for all states. 
Thus, the 
The variable RIRG has coefficients significant at the 10 percent 
1 eve 1 in 12 states but only 3 of these coefficients show the expected 
sign. The coefficients of variable Fare significant at 10 percent 
level 1.n 6 states. Four out of these 6 coefficients have the expected 
sign. The variable POP has significant coefficients at the 10 percent 
level in 11 states and 7 of these coefficients have the expected sign. 
The interaction between tax rate and inflation (XCIGD) has 
significant coefficients in 13 states. The expected coefficient signs 
for this variable are not clear because the variable XCIGD has 
positive impact on both price and rent. The coefficients of the time 
variable are significant at the 10 percent level in 12 states. 
The ratio model presents low t-values but high R2 which 




New Hampshire 2. 388 
t-va1ue o. 304 
Vermont 19.103 
t-va1ue 7. 209* 
Massachusetts 31. 374 
t-va1ue 3. 905* 




New York -2.075 
t-va1ue -0.479 
New Jersey 9. 315 
t-va1ue 10.785* 
TABLE XI 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT FOR THE RATIO OF 
NET CASH RENT TO FARM LAND PRICE 
MODELS WITH VARIABLE XCIGD 
RIRG F POP XCI GO T 
-4.427 15.161 1594.768 -0.062 -0.311 
-3.25 3* 1. 306 1.556 -3.526* -1.646 
1.664 -4.351 -5 31.068 0.025 0.499 
1.543 -0.95 7 -2.043* 1. 743* 1.416 
0.240 -8.214 -549.448 0.004 0.143 
o. 491 -1.267 -2.678* 0.707 1.462 
-1 .544 0.147 -46.245 -0.020 0.176 
-2.364* 0.027 -2 .107* -2.407* 1.138 
o. 611 4.901 -6.985 0.006 -0.175 
1. 216 1.283 -0.578 0.993 -:-2. 009* 
o. 283 1. 320 -9.924 0.002 -0.042 
o. 385 o. 319 -0.652 0. 217 -0.235 
o. 308 -9.254 39.027 0.002 -0.123 
0.745 -2 .149* 2.4Sf>* 0.442 -2.099* 
-0. 345 0.062 -15 .131 -0.004 0.111 
-1. 397 0.025 -4.524* -1.447 2.020* 
R2 F-Va1ue Region 
0.8124 21.64 NE 
0.5530 6.18 NE 
o. 77 33 17 .OS NE 
0.7936 19.22 NE 
0.8206 22.86 NE 
0.6261 B. 37 NE 
o. 7611 15.92 NE 
0.8930 41.73 NE 
"'-1 
0 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP XCIGD T R2 F-Value Region 
Pennsylvania 7. 263 0.172 -1.384 12.448 0.001 -0.119 0.9573 112.18 NE 
t-value 2.036* 1.120 -0.557 0.669 0.643 -3. 954* 
Delaware 10.604 0.608 -4.984 61.893 0.007 -0. 381 o. 605 7 7.68 NE 
t-value 6 .198* 1.460 -1.134 3. 245* 1.416 -3. 356* 
Maryland ll. 096 0.034 4.200 -33.831 -0.001 0.067 0.8980 43.99 NE 
t-value 8.615* 0.091 0.784 -2.643'>'c -0.163 0.637 
Michigan 9.333 -0.139. 3.078 33.691 -0.003 -0.137 0.9476 90.36 LS 
t-va1ue 8. 236* -0.723 1. 265 1. 659 -1.086 -3.286* 
Wisconsin 10.443 0.090 -8.402 52. 36 7 0.001 -0.129 0.8144 21.06 LS 
t-value 3.838* o. 325 -1.588 0.484 0.340 -1.317 
Minnesota 0. 936 -0.556 1.893 413.376 -0.007 -0.164 0.47 26 4. 30 LS 
t-value 0. 280 -2.415* o. 472 1.949* -2.437* -1.609 
Ohio 4. 955 0.051 0.090 11.371 0.0002 -0.05 3 0.6941 11.34 CB 
t-value 4. 345* 0. 322 0.042 1 .165 0.109 -1.595 
Indiana 2.289 -0.135 2. 399 88.890 -0.002 -0.121 0.3617 2.87 CB 
t-va1ue 0.644 -0.414 0.533 1. 339 -0.5 30 -1 .111 
Illinois 5. 778 -0.5 38 -3.231 -8.883 -0.007 0.055 o. 5 991 7. 47 CB 
t-value 3.640* -2.603* -1. 716* -0.426 -2. 395* 1.034 
Iowa -4.036 -0.876 -7.907 222.633 -0.011 0.051 0.6785 10.13 CB -...J 
t-value -0.662 -4.812* -1.995* 1.428 -4.339* 1. 617* 
...... 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP XCIGD T R2 F-Value Region 
Missouri 2.174 0.168 3.417 166.866 0.002 -0.122 0.3946 3. 25 CB 
t-value 0. 316 0.767 0.815 0.884 0.692 -1.256 
North Dakota 4. 356 -1.176 -6.486 324.002 -0.015 0.102 0.7424 14.41 NP 
t-value 0.603 -S.lll* -2.173* 0. 363 -5.460* 4.711* 
South Dakota 8.545 -0.466 -1.856 59.902 -0.006 -0.005 0.7565 15.5 3 NP 
t-value 2.845* -4.067* -l.lll 0.164 -3.85 3* -0.368 
Kansas 5.484 -0.162 -0.288 ll1.789 -0.002 -0.035 o. 4154 3.41 NP 
t-value l. 908* -0.948 -0.097 0.691 -0.961 -1.124 
Virginia 17.950 -0. 371 -2.942 -104.477 -0.00 7 0.045 0.7292 12.92 AP 
t-value 7.608* -0.75 7 -0.426 -0.553 -1.109 0.135 
West Virginia 58.70 7 1.967 16.267 -504.311 0.022 -0.376 0. 8639 31.73 AP 
t-value 4.661* 2. 351* 0.830 -3.076* 1. 984* -5.236* 
North Carolina 29 .5 27 0. 335 7o170 -39o178 OoOOl -0 0 299 Oo7560 14o 87 AP 
t-value So696* Oo490 lo 359 -0 olS 2 0 o132 -0 0 974 
Kentucky 22.499 Ool76 8o076 -248o588 OoOOOl Oo054 Oo7833 18o07 AP 
t-value 3o787* Oo 413 Oo944 -1.455 Oo019 0 o586 
Tennessee 21 0 625 -0o064 17 0 813 -41 0 041 -OoOOS -0 ol44 Oo 9285 64o 95 AP 
t-va1ue 7 0 251* -Oo172 2o 309* -Oo 308 -1.130 -10 160 
"-.) 
N 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP XCIGD T R2 F-Value Region 
South C aro 1 ina 18.507 -0.516 -1.144 50.426 -0.008 -0.192 0 0 97 25 176.93 SE 
t-value 22.091* -2.088* -0.826 1.016 -2.763* -4 0 358* 
Georgia 26.635 -0.136 -1.399 -so. 438 -0.002 -0.206 0 0 8477 26.71 SE 
t-value 12.546* -0.243 -0 0 207 -0.263 -0 0 361 -0.962 
Florida 9. 398 0.577 3.091 -60.334 0.007 -0.028 o. 7328 13.16 SE 
t-value 0.724 o. 902 0.557 -0.853 0.898 -0.097 
Alabama 7.890 -0.781 -5.848 525 0 823 -0.010 -0.45 7 0.8944 42. 32 SE 
t-value 1.508 -1.847* -0.851 2.861* -1. 968* -4.267* 
Mississippi 29.512 0 0 811 -6.864 40.189 0.009 -0. 395 0 0 9130 52.47 DS 
t-value 50 303* 1. 348 -0.725 o. 201 1.190 -5 .632* 
Arkansas 27.683 o. 672 25.647 -283.203 0.009 -0.226 o. 9270 63.66 DS 
t-value 11.100* 2. 004* 2.886* -2. 200* 1. 968* -6.112* 
Louisiana 17 .183 1.130 1.116 -130.281 0.015 -0.116 0.8800 36.65 OS 
t-value 12.149* 3. 341* o. 242 -1.104 3. 351* -0.906 
Oklahoma 10 0 417 0.091 1. 413 -108.175 0.001 -0.043 0.9228 59.77 SP 
t-va1ue 15 0 915* 0.427 0.533 -1.149 0.565 -1.294 
NE = North Eastern States; LS = Lake States; CB = Corn Belt States; NP = Northern Plains States; 
AP = Appalachian States; SE = Southeast States; DS =Delta States; SP = Southern Plains States 
-..J 
w 




New Hampshire 185.02 




t-value -0. 97 
Rhode Island -4124.60 
t-va1ue -2.17* 
Connecticut -1671.72 
t-value -5 .s 2* 
New York 321.99 
t-va 1ue 2. 91 * 
New Jersey -3370. 01 
t-va1ue -10. 90* 
TABLE XII 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR FARMLAND 
PRICE MODEL WITH VARIABLE XCIGD 
RIRG F POP XCIGD R 
167.91 40 6. 81 -17282.70 2. 30 2.93 
2.56* 1.03 -0. 31 2.68* 0 .so 
4. 36 27.08 75938.06 -0.42 3.73 
0.06 0.09 4.5 7* -0.48 o.so 
109.96 -164.11 325 78.19 1. 36 -0.10 
3.5 1* -0.38 2.54* 3.28* -0.02 
271. 28 -86.25 -3844.92 4.05 28.32 
3.19* -0.12* -1. 36 3.69* 3.5 2* 
146.01 44.62 2702.97 2.55 26.07 
1.00 0.03 0.76 1. 39 3.04* 
126. 34 1402.92 -1049.48 2. 32 7.01 
1. 25 2.50* -0.50 1.72* 1. 23 
-2.24 227. 38 -3382.16 -0.07 4.02 
-0. 21 1.96* -6. 96* -0. 5 1 1. 24 
181.69 2848.11 -7356.35 2.54 -16.67 
2.02* 3. 33>'c -4. 70* 2.10* -1.86* 
T R2 F-Value Region 
4.64 0. 7062 9. 21 NE 
0. 41 
-87.11 0. 87 21 26.13 NE 
-3.79 
-7 .OS 0. 9251 49.43 NE 
-1 .14 
33.5 9 0.9372 59.71 NE 
1.69 
18. 32 0.7475 11.84 NE 
0.70 
26.60 0. 9497 75 .s 7 NE 
1.09 
16.21 o. 9870 304.5 2 NE 
67.0* 




TABLE XII (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP XCIGD R T R2 F-Value Region 
Pennsylvania 1689.41 7.97 589.77 -11768.30 0.03 54.41 17.76 o. 9899 392.51 NE 
t-value 1.43 -0.20 1.09 -1.50 0.08 5.03* 1. 23 
Delaware -958.02 23.05 820.46 -8985.07 0.45 27.16 45.91 o. 9869 301.98 NE 
t-value -2.00 0.62 2.09* -3.40* 0. 95 6.14* 2.44* 
Mary land -3461.82 78.12 -934.40 -12188.10 1. 32 B. 31 117.63 o. 9777 175.50 NE 
t-value -5 .58* 1.22 -1.06 -2.63* 1.67 o. 95 3.04* 
Michigan -45.93 22.29 216 .27 -21525.00 o. 32 17.89 47.74 0.9561 83.48 LS 
t-value -0.19 0.66 0.56 -5 .04* 0.75 3. 30* 5. 37* 
Wisconsin -219.40 12.03 967.49 4715.81 0.07 26.85 -5.35 0.9626 98.66 LS 
t-value -0.89 0. 47 2.15* o. 41 o. 21 7 .13* -o.47 
Minnesota 358.77 40.84 -247.73 -18794.37 0.60 22.74 2. 71 0.9572 85.73 LS 
t-value 0. 81 1. 32 -0.5 3 -0.63 1.48 9.69* 0.17 
Ohio 62.23 -34.62 103.44 4279.39 -0.25 31.41 -17.33 0.9935 610.92 CB 
t-value o. 24 -0.63 0.22 1.58 -0.34 10. 32* -1.97* 
Indiana -11.81 33.94 -55.63 4915.31 0.50 22.10 -14.77 0. 95 7'1 85.5 2 CB 
t-value -0.01 o. 47 -0.06 0.28 0.5 2 5.85* -0.52 
Illinois -127.35 37.93 639.34 12541.97 o. 77 29.89 -42. 383 o. 97 95 183.15 CB 
t-value -0.23 0.5 2 1.11 1. 28 0.80 7.63* -1.715 
Iowa 2046.56 15 2. 70 1188.09 -55271.80 2. 02 20.19 -3. 32 0. 97 28 137. 09 CB "--.1 
t-value 1.40 2.40* 1. 38 -1. 38 2. 32* 7.50 -0.35 
\.J1 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP XCIGD R T R2 F-Value Region 
Missouri 64.34 -16.15 -341. 31 35 2. 88 -0.23 20. 20 -0.42 o. 9978 1845.45 CB 
t-va1ue 0. 27 -1.17 -2.39* 0. OS -1.24 18.23* -o.ll 
North Dakota -101.59 37 .OS -9.51 8649.17 0.46 16.94 -2.81 0.9964 739.17 NP 
t-value -0.59 4.13* -0.12 o. 40* 3. 91 * 11.31 * -4.64* 
South Dakota -42.50 8. 20 17. 31 5462.65 0.09 21 .69 -1.269 o. 9946 767.79 NP 
t-va1ue -0.52 1.20 0. 37 o. 47 0.93 11.42* -3.00* 
Kansas -104.70 35 .s 3 -89.05 1629.28 0.50 20.93 -2.18 0.9911 447.64 NP 
t-va1ue -0.91 2. 25* -0.5 7 0.19 2. 39* 6.12* -1.082 
Virginia -963.58 122.00 633.93 -13522.60 1.63 18.84 26.01 0.9792 188. 39 AP 
t-value -5 .s 7* 4. 71 * 1.96* -1.80* 5.17* 4.57* 1.87* 
West Virginia -3607.42 78.23 -5 72.69 30689 .s 5 1.15 0.17 14.5 7 0.9603 96.70 AP 
t-value -5. 82* 1. 70 -0.59 3.11* 1.87* 0.03 4.12* 
North C aro 1 ina -1594.69 117.48 -310.14 13601.04 1.68 10.60 -5.46 0. 9834 237.06 AP 
t-va1ue -9.17* 5.71* -1.43 1.44 6.86* 5.08* -0.49 
Kentucky -607.43 8.09 -562.00 12219.41 o. 24 22.12 -8.35 o. 9816 213.7 3 AP 
t-value -1.10 0.27 -0.93 1.01 0.5 9 6.83* -1.41 
Tennessee -97 3. 86 58. 33 -1412.64 14789.68 0.99 17.42 -11.75 0.9908 430.5 2 AP 
t-va1ue -3.41* 3.53* -3.89* 1. 83* 4.85* 6.10* -1.83* 
'-I 
0\ 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP XCIGD R T R2 F-Value Region 
South C aro 1 ina -544.21 49.07 -so. 63 8330.42 0.72 29.82 -9.21 0.9884 341 .01 SE 
t-value -3. 06* 2. 72* -0.49 1. 90* 3. 21 * 5. 99* -2.92* 
Georgia -1333.68 91.86 -5 32.42 40124.56 1.40 -1.61 -30.78 0.9889 35 7.1 7 SE 
t-value -6.50* 4.90* -2. 21* 5.44* 6.02* -0.29 -4.71 * 
Florida 189 3. 35 -10. 96 -401.23 17908.48 0.06 29.08 -58.51 0.9742 150.75 SE 
t-value 2. 31 * -0.25 -0.99 4.03* 0.11 5.02* -3.49* 
Alabama 649.21 32.60 -144.04 -206 71.90 o. 36 33.83 5.45 0. 975 7 160.75 SE 
t-value 1.74* l. 33 -0 .so -2.35 1.12 7.66* l. 21 
Mississippi -1052.60 98.34 398.92 7015.49 1.29 12.08 2.09 0.9384 58. 39 DS 
t-value -3.12~" 2.76* o. 97 0.69 2.73* 3.03* 0.5 3 
Arkansas -311.66 39.20 -1114.66 2368.43 0.48 26.5 3 -1.75 0.9841 247.15 DS 
t-value -1.20 1.42 -2.12* o. 29 l. 31 8.04* -0.80 
Louisiana -870.64 87.39 551.11 6384.59 1.15 13.91 -1.59 o. 965 2 106. 31 DS 
t-value -4.26* 2.50* 1.78* 0.63* 2.49* 5.76* -0.14 
Oklahoma -5 97 .01 l. 34 -400.88 40301.98 0.05 5. 71 -13.22 0. 9891 363.13 SP 
t-value -3. 77* 0.05 -1.59 4.16* 0.18 5 .51* -4 .1'5* 
NE =North Eastern States; LS =Lake States; CB =Corn Belt States; NP =Northern Plains States; 
AP = Appalachian States; SE = Southeast States; DS =Delta States; SP = Southern Plains States 
"' "' * = Significant at 10% level. 
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The correlation matrix among variables indicated a high correlation 
between real interest rate on farm mortgage loans (RIRG) and the 
.interaction between tax rate and inflation (XCIGD). The 
multicollinearity problem did not occur 1.n the pooled-data model 
because there are more observations than 1.n the state data set. The 
multicollinearity can cause the unexpected signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients (Maddala, 1977). To correct this problem, the variable 
XCIGD is dropped from the model. 
In the price model (Table XII), all equations show a high R2 
The composite hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero is 
rejected. There are 14 states showing significant coefficients at 10 
percent level for real interest rate on farm loans (RIRG) but none of 
the coefficients has the expected sign. The unexpected sign can be 
caused by mu 1 tic o 11 i near i ty between this variable and the variable 
XCIGD. The estimated coefficients for variable F are significant in 
11 s tate s and 7 of the co e f f i c i en t s show expected signs. The 
coefficients of population density are significant at the 10 percent 
level in 15 states. Eight of the coefficients have the expected sign. 
The variable XCIGD has significant coefficients and expected signs in 
16 states. The estimated coefficients of variable Rare also 
significant at that level in 32 states and only 1 coefficient does not 
have the expected sign. 
significant in 17 states. 
The coefficients of the time variable are 
The price model exhibits results similar to the ratio model. The 
estimated coefficients for both ratio and pr1.ce models are shown in 
Tables XIII and XIV. 
In the ratio model, the calculated F-values for all equations 
indicate that the composite hypothesis for all estimated coefficients 
States Intercept 
Maine 47. 25 3 
t-value 4. 754* 
New Harnpshi re 12. 311 
t-value 2 .185* 
Vermont 18.430 
t-value 7 .5 25* 
Massachusetts 16. 216 
t-value 2. 987* 
Rhode Is land 19.867 
t-value 3.429* 
Connecticut 9. 013 
t-value 4.541 * 
New York -0.485 
t-value -0. 204 
New Jersey 8.602 
t-value 11. 885* 
TABLE XIII 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT FOR THE RATIO OF NET 
CASH RENT FOR FARMLAND PRICE MODEL (RA) 
RIRG F POP T 
o. 318 -6.138 -1573.770 0.172 
1. 301 -0.516 -2.659* 1.097 
-0.164 -4.065 -191.552 0.112 
-0.637 -0.862 -1.072 0. 393 
-0.091 -9.479 -462.177 0.124 
-0.65 8 -1.5 36 -2. 847* 1. 329 
-0.003 -3.511 -5.454 -0.148 
-0.020 -0.627 -0.360 -1-.796* 
0.127 3.740 -12.097 -0.114 
1.032 1.029 -1 .107 -1.85 2* 
0.125 1. 228 -12.702 -0.007 
1.007 o. 304 -1.567 -0.094 
0.129 -8.438 33.183 -0.099 
1 • 5 91 -2. 203* 3.826* -4.461* 
0.004 -0.156 -11.237 0.039 
0.087 -0.061 -5.546* 1.645 
R2 F-Value Region 
0. 7190 16.330 NE 
0.4987 6. 46 7 NE 
0.7688 21.611 NE 
0. 7458 19.071 NE 
0. 8135 28. 35 2 NE 
0. 625 4 10.85 2 NE 
0. 7592 20. 497 NE 
0.8841 49.561 NE 
....... 
\0 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP T R2 F-Value Region 
Pennsylvania 8. 981 0.076 -1.068 3. 745 -0.103 0.9566 143.362 NE 
t-value 3.848* 2.086>'< -0.444 0. 297 -6.190>'< 
Delaware 10. 229 0.037 -4.548 44.255 -0.257 0.5 740 8.760 NE 
t-value 5.938* 0. 348 -1.018 3.007* -3.486* 
Maryland 11.156 0.093 4. 347 -32. 232 o. 053 0.8978 57.129 NE 
t-value 9. 208* 1.177 0.839 -4.012* 0.964 
Michigan 8.419 0.066 1.5 34 50.47 3 -0.175 0. 9451 111.892 LS 
t-va1ue 11.05 7* 1. 862* o. 774 3.815* -7 .583* 
Wisconsin 10.296 0.055 -6.800 52.112 -0.121 0.8904 52.826 LS 
t-va1ue 4.712* 0.993 -1.673 0.5 36 -1.401 
Minnesota -0. 305 -0.007 -3.991 481.136 -0.233 0. 35 42 3.428 LS 
t-va1ue ,-0. 084 -0.147 -1.112 2.088* -2.156* 
Ohio 5.044 0.034 0.15 3 10.529 -0.049 0.6939 14.736 CB 
t-value 6. 485* 1 .137 0.076 1. 806* -3.495* 
Indiana 0. 865 0.035 2.189 116.85 7 -0.172 0. 3545 3.5 70 CB 
t-value o. 377 0.5 74 0.495 2.943* -3.255* 
Illinois 2.45 3 0.004 -3.499 31.728 -0.055 0. 3132 2.850 CB 
t-va 1ue 1.700* 0.127 -1.673 1. 975* -1. 97 2* 
Iowa -3.494 -0.102 -17.3_16 210.838 -0.009 0.4360 4. 831 CB 00 
t-value -0.438 -2.291* -3.916* 1.034 -0. 266 0 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP T R2 F-Va1ue Region 
Missouri 5.074 0.021 3.484 85.056 -0.072 0. 3830 4.035 CB 
t-va1ue o. 939 0. 396 0.839 0.584 -1.118 
North Dakota 19.086 0.019 -10.474 -1495.480 0.039 0.4352 5.009 NP 
t-va1ue 1.962* 0.191 -2 .492* -1.243 1 .463 
South Dakota 10.112 -0.029 -0.708 -103.705 -0.045 0.4392 4".895 NP 
t-va1ue 2. 330* -0.650 -0.421 -0.200 -3.788* 
Kansas 5. 382 0.002 -1 .138 129.640 -0.05 4 0.3338 3.132 NP 
t-va1ue 1.764* 0.040 -0.432 0.756 -1.917* 
Virginia 17.779 0.152 -3.251 -53.660 -0.086 0.7264 16.5 90 AP 
t-va1ue 7.589* 1.051 -0.465 -0.289 -0. 266 
West Virginia 43.289 0.338 24.197 -285. 232 -0. 251 0. 8425 34.762 AP 
t-va1ue 4 .139* 1. 988* 1.195 -2.231 * -6.856* 
North Caro 1ina 29.299 o. 246 7.054 -23. 246 -0. 313 0.7560 16.364 AP 
t-va1ue 6 .104* 1. 816* 1. 382 -0.104 -1.090 
Kentucky 22.418 0.168 8.011 -246.120 0.05 3 o. 7833 23.491 AP 
t-va1ue 5. 677* 1. 794* 1.046 -2. 332* 0.737 
Tennessee 23.711 0. 344 19.826 -151.731 -0.056 0.9249 80.018 AP 
t-va1ue 10.067* 3.697* 2.628* -1.668 -0.576* 
(X) 
,...... 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP T R2 F-Value Region 
South Carolina 19.485 0.098 -0. 332 -52.924 -0.134 o. 9270 79.366 SE 
t-value 17.083* 1. 801 * -0.238 -1.073 -2. 402* 
Georgia 26. 330 0.062 -0.484 -80.171 -0.186 0.8468 34.546 SE 
t-value 13.756* 0.558 -0.079 -0.47 2 -0.916 
Florida 12.793 0.017 3.234 -44.560 -0. OS 3 0. 65 89 12.073 SE 
t-value 1 .135 0.145 0.620 -0.707 -0.192 
Alabama 8.178 O.Oll -10.599 470.168 -0.47 3 0.8780 46.774 SE 
t-value 1. 484 0.080 -1.564 2. 456* .;.4.194* 
Mississippi 28. 302 O.ll8 -1.889 ll2.827 -0. 369 0. 9081 64.216 DS 
t-value 5.132 0. 778 -0. 221 0.589 -5. 487* 
Arkansas 25.98 2 0.030 24.928 -149.468 -0. 215 0.9156 70.5 59 DS 
t-value 10.540* 0. 367 2.664* -1 • 297 -5.588* 
Louisiana 17.067 0.023 1.567 -60.162 -0.096 0. 7131 15.5 34 DS 
t-va lue 9.018* 0. 215 o. 340 -0. 396 -0.576 
Oklahoma 10. 309 -0.027 1.5 34 -68.467 -0.054 0. 9218 76.645 SP 
t-value 16.698* -0.671 o. 5 88 -1. 109 -2.010* 












Rhode Is land -2868.34 
t-va1ue -1.68 
Connecticut -1454.91 
t-value -5 .08* 
New York 274.53 
t-value 4.51* 
New Jersey -2968.87 
t-va1ue -11.45* 
TABLE XIV 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT FOR FARMLAND 
PRICE MODEL (V) 
RIRG F POP R 
-5.82 858.7 3 81392.83 -0.22 
-0.56 2.18* 1. 78* -0.03 
35.84 28.5 7 70695.60 4.09 
2.73* 0.10 5.72* 0.56 
11.76 184.46 41496.28 8. 32 
1.68 0. 48 2. 68* 2.23* 
-36.81 606 .s 3 -12012.67 20.71 
-1.86* 0.76 -5.5 9* 2.17* 
-so. 88 -382.29 7 31.80 24.81 
-1.39 -0.34 0.22 2.86 
-45 .11 1302.80 -3977. 39 8.5 3 
-2 .s 2* 2. 25* -3.26* 1.46 
3.15 208.27 -3181.7 2 4.40 
1.48 1.93* -11.05* 1.41 
-3.72 295 3.05 -9966.48 -23.48 
-0.20 3. 24 -9.85* -2.63* 
T R2 F-Va1ue Region 
-6.35 0. 6059 7. 37 NE 
-0.53 
-81.41 0.8717 32.61 NE 
-4.21* 
-5.64 o. 8650 20.00 NE 
-0.63 
97.93 0. 9015 45.75 NE 
8. 34* 
42.23 0. 7 271 13.32 NE 
2. ll* 
62.48 0.9435 83.45 NE 
5. 21 * 
15.29 0. 9869 376.41 NE 
9.43* 




TABLE XIV (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP R T R2 F-Value Region 
Pennsylvania 1703.24 -10.96 5 95.6 7 -11765. 39 54.76 17.74 0. 9899 490 .so NE 
t-va1ue 1.49 -1.24 1.13 -1.53 5.64* l. 26 
Delaware -938.88 -11.07 852.5 2 -9839.96 24.56 51.78 o. 9864 363.44 NE 
t-value -1.97* -1.19 2.18* -3. 97* 6.27* 2. 92* 
Maryland -3842.18 -27.03 -1169.56 -16792.18 4.018 158.27 0.9751 195.80 NE 
t-va1ue -6.42* -1 • 96* -1.29 -4. 35* 0.47 5.07* 
Michigan 202. 37 -4.42 -238.08 -19801. 39 29.02 40.36 o. 9770 211. 97 LS 
t-value l. 27 -0.59 -0.50 -5.03* 4.87* 4.59* 
Wisconsin -204.43 6.71 1108.58 4161.88 20.83 -4.51 0. 95 93 113.13 LS 
t-va1ue -0.88 1. 30 2.60* 0. 37 7.5 3* -0.40 
Minnesota. 423. 30 -4.09 102.28 14832.17 24.02 1.99 0. 9548 101. 39 LS 
t-value 0.94 -0.7 3 0. 24 -0.48 10.68* 0.12 
Ohio -0.75 -15.69 67.75 4177. 26 30.60 -17.33 0.9935 759.81 CB 
t-va 1ue -0.01 -2. 30* 0.15 1.58 16 .00* -2.01* 
Indiana 119.64 -3.37 -88.62 4829.63 23. 24 -13.89 o. 95 74 10 7. 87 CB 
t-va1ue 0.18 -0.36 -0.11 0.28 7.61* -0.50 
I 11inoi s 110.61 -19.54 690.98 11711 • 75 31. 37 -39.47 0. 97 97 231.65 CB 
t-va1ue 0. 24 -2.11* l. 22 l. 22 8. 94* -1.64 
Iowa 1286.91 5. 32 1713.17 -21999.44 24.46 -6.61 0.9617 120.5 2 CB CXl 
t-va1ue 0.83 0.69 1. 93* -0.53 11. 25* -0.64 .p. 
TABLE XIV (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP R T R2 F-Value Region 
Missouri 3.64 0.66 -358.83 28.11 19.01 -0.33 o. 9977 216 7.62 CB 
t-va1ue 0.01 0.34 -2.50* 0.01 33.96* -0.09 
North Dakota -211.82 2.5 8 -86.5 3 41264.27 21.77 -3.26 0. 9912 561.85 NP 
t-va1ue -1.00 1. 23 -0.90 1.65 20.44* -4.37 
South Dakota -56.50 0.74 8.90 10894.85 23.33 -1.34 0.9946 925.82 NP 
t-va1ue -0.71 0.68 0.19 1.10 32.08* -3.25 
Kansas -64.86 -1.5 7 -87.03 10833.77 28.14 -4.54 0. 9890 450.74 NP 
t-va1ue -0.52 -0.51 -0.51 1. 36 15.96* -2. 36* 
Virginia -408.05 -6.13 940.18 -17677.32 34.21 32. 24 0. 9560 108.75 AP 
t-va1ue -2.11* -0.58 2.08* -1.66 8.42* 1.64 
West Virginia -4233.48 -6.96 7 -344.20 40671.06 3.90 19.63 0.9545 104.79 AP 
t-value -7.72* -0.79 -0.33 6. 31 * o. 90 8.19* 
North Caro 1ina -2014.51 -7.71 -540. 38 38805. 35 9. 35 -25 .54 o. 9099 48.47 AP 
t-value -8.15* -0.97 -1.85* 3.28* 3. 30* -1.70* 
Kentucky -594.70 -10.00 -567.76 14248.22 23.26 -9.69 0. 9814 263.19 AP 
t-value -1.09 -1 .67 -0.95 1. 25 9.04* -1. 80* 
Tennessee -1089.78 -19. 31 -1635.12 29131.17 20. 38 -24.20 0. 981 8 269.17 AP 
t-va1ue -2. 77* -3.47* -3. 29>'< 2.81* 5. 30* -2. 99* 
00 
ln 
TABLE XIV (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP R T R2 F-Value Region 
South Carolina -617.66 -3. 26 -85 .00 15127. 27 29.59 -11.76 0. 9681 151.73 SE 
t-value -3.05* -0.86 -0.88 3.12* 5 .18* -2. 92* 
Georgia -1099.15 -9.67 -65 7. 26 43784.12 2. 57 -29.45 0.9386 73. 37 SE 
t-value -5.73* -1.86* -2. 37* 4.68* 0. 47 -3.06* 
Florida 197 2. 43 -15.70 -414.61 18329.81 29.17 -60.00 0. 97 41 188. 33 SE 
t-value 4 .58* -1.669 -1.09 7.46* 5.18* -5. 80* 
Alabama 889.35 5.82 -61 .54 -23256.02 37.40 6.23 0. 9744 190.65 SE 
t-value 2.89* 1.07 -0.22 -2.7 2* 12.1 7* 1. 38 
Mississippi -610.02 -0.56 948.25 7309.63 20. 31 1. 33 0.9428 82.35 OS 
t-value -1.71* -0.07 1.90* 0.69 5 .10* o. 33 
Arkansas -165 .10 3. 47 -1221.76 3175 .OS 29.5 2 -1.83 o. 9829 287 .89 OS 
t-value -0.69 0. 7 3 -2. 32 0. 38 12. 22* -0.82 
Louisiana -401.92 -0.47 5 35.08 2997.35 20. 33 1.58 0. 97 83 225.17 OS 
t-value -2. 68* -0.06 1.48 0. 32 10. 39* 0.16 
Oklahoma -584 .59 -3.01 -399.50 40937.03 26.20 -13.46 0. 98 91 45 3. 25 SP 
t-value -4.11 * -0.75 -1.61 4.60* 6. 92* -4.71 * 




equal to zero can be rejected. The performance of this model, in 
terms of the expected signs, is improved. Eight states have 
significant coefficients at the 10 percent level for the var{able 
RIRG. Only one of these coefficients does not have the expected sign. 
The coefficients of variable F are significant at the 10 percent 
level in 6 states and 4 states show the expected sign. The 
coefficients of population density (POP) are significant in 14 states 
and 6 of these coefficients show the expected sign. The coefficients 
of time variable are significant in 17 states. 
Most estimated coefficients in the ratio model show the expected 
sign even though several are not significant. The empirical results 
from the econometric model for most states support the theoretical 
framework in Chapter II. When the real interest rate on farm mortgage 
loans (RIRG) increases, it causes the rent-farmland price ratio to 
increase due to the d~clining land price. The proportion of Federal 
Land Bank loans made to the total agricultural debt (F) indicates that 
a greater Federal Land Bank role in farm credit market causes farmland 
price to increase relative to rent in most states. Increases in 
population density reduce the rent-farmland price ratio in most 
states. 
The estimated price model 1n Table XIV without XCIGD shows 
2 
imp.rovements over the model in Table XII. The values of R rema1n 
high. The composite hypothesis of all estimated coefficients except 
the intercept term equal to zero is rejected in all states. In 
addition, the number of expected signs increased for all variables, 
especially variable RIRG. In the latter model, the coefficients of 
variable RIRG are significant at 10 percent level in 8 states and only 
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1 of these coefficients show an unexpected sign. The coefficients of 
variable F are significant at the 10 percent level in 14 states. Nine 
of these coefficients have the expected sign. The net cash rent 
variable (R) has significant coefficients in 28 states and only 1 of 
these coefficients show unexpected signs. The coefficients of the 
time variable are significant in 21 states. 
In summary, coefficients in the price model indicate that 
increases in real interest rates on farm mortgage loans depress 
farmland price whereas increases in Federal Land Bank involvement, 
population density, and net cash rent boost farmland price in most 
states. 
An Alternative Value for Rent 
Variable in the Price Model 
Previously, rent has been used to represent farmland earnings. 
The cash rent variable measures land earnings imperfectly. Some past 
studies suggest that farm income is a use fu 1 proxy for land earnings. 
Thus, rent will be replaced by net farm income in reestimating an 
equation for each state. The results are presented in Table XV. The 
2 values of the R in most states are high and the hypothesis that all 
coefficients e·qual zero is rejected in all equations. The number of 
expected signs on variables is reduced when compared to the equations 
using rent. The coefficients of variable RIRG have the expected sign 
in 18 states compared to 25 states in the old model. Coefficients of 
variables F and POP show the expected sign in 13 and 17 states, 
respectively. The coefficients of net farm income show the expected 
sign in 14 states compared to 33 states for the rent variable. 
States Intercept 
Maine -2149.33 
t-value -5 .54* 
New Hampshire -76 .12 
t-value -0.28 
Vermont -1494.00 
t-value -5. 32* 
Massachusetts 2096. 25 
t-value 2.64* 
Rhode Is land -2976.11 
t-value -1.49 
Connecticut -1439.29 
t-va lue -4. 92* 
New York 255.94 
t-value 4.47* 
New Jersey -2934.92 
t-value -8.99* 
TABLE XV 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT FOR LAND PRICE 
MODEL USING NET FARM INCOME 
RIRG F POP RI 
-6.62 1734.18 945 71.29 -2.99 
-0.69 3.54* 4 .12>'< -4.76* 
31.21 142.01 61861.91 -7.98 
2.5 7* 0.56 6.76* -2.68* 
9.85 97.75 45984.22 0.71 
1.22 -0.02 2.76* o. 33 
-26.17 125.5 3 -12296.33 -3.81 
-1.25 0.15 -1.94* -1.94* 
-53. 28 534. 36 3061 .11 -0.51 
-1.19 0.43 0.81 -0.18 
-46.20 1471.33 -4952.01 -1 .46 
-2.51* 2.38* -3.91* -0.96 
1.18 59.71 -3341.82 -1 .13 
0. 51 0.60 -15.65* -2. 25* 
-1.85 3272.69 -8297.67 -1.49 
-0.08 3.00* -9.71* -0.72 
T R2 F-Value Region 
-10.98 0.8749 34.97 NE 
-1. 81* 
-66.76 0.9311 67.5 7 NE 
-4.58* 
-6.70 0 .7978 18.93 NE 
-0.72 
105.41 0. 8983 44.16 NE , 
8. 27* 
17.96 0.6380 8.81 NE 
o. 85 
73.75 o. 9408 7 9.49 NE 
5.54* 
17.5 7 0. 9882 419.60 NE 
32.5 3* 




TABLE XV (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP RI T R2 F-Value Region 
Pennsylvania 7197 .56 10.5 6 1018.88 -50508.88 1.44 91.20 0. 977 3 215.56 NE 
t-value 7.96* 0. 88 1. 27 -9. 64*• o. 56 11. 21 * 
Delaware -4046.42 -6.16 ll20. 26 -247 65.00 -1.80 166.80 0. 9697 159.77 NE 
t-value -15. 48* -0.44 1.96* -12.04* -1. 94>'< 14.98>'< 
Mary land -3967.38 -24.87 -1240.95 -17914.98 1. 79 166.16 o. 975 8 201. 42 NE 
t-value -15.66* -1.80* -1.39 -11. 92* o. 96 14.56* 
Michigan -28.25 -1.76 1017.03 -32160.46 -2.40 76.74 0.9392 74.14 LS 
t-va lue -0.12 -0. 23 2.64* -8. 45* -1.62 12.29* 
Wisconsin 151.51 18.79 2324. 39 -36646.53 3.58 40.68 0. 9187 54.24 LS 
t-value 0. 38 1.96* 3.22* -2.00* 1.49 2. 37* 
Minnesota 780. 36 11.53 1505. 95 -173932.70 -0. 31 1ll. 89 0. 7804 17.05 LS 
t-value 0.67 0.70 1. 38 -2. 34* -0.13 3.16* 
Ohio 74.29 2.28 1411.78 -24008.76 0.18 94.67 0.8383 24.88 CB 
t-value 0 .ll 0.14 1.06 -4.83* 0.08 8. 30* 
Indiana 2332.08 -16.18 1397. 30 -93518.90 2.15 165 .57 0. 8341 24.13 CB 
t-value 2 .12* -1.02 1.02 -4.96* 1.04 6.83* 
Illinois 1683. 35 0.11 1739.50 -61392.10 -o .004 159.27 0. 887 9 38.01 CB 
t-value 1. 83* 0.01 1.62 -6.09* -0.003 9. 23* 
Iowa 4324.61 22.46 7642.18 -183963.15 0.28 76.31 0.7983 18. 99 CB 1.0 0 
t-va1ue 0.96 0. 91 3.09* -1.59 0.09 3. 49* 
TABLE XV (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP RI T R2 F-Va1ue Region 
Missouri 907. 21 -4.71 -96.37 -62760.62 -1 .18 53.68 0.8037 19.62 CB 
t-va1ue 0. 91 -0.59 -0.15 -2.32* -0.51 4. 35* 
North Dakota -1445.18 1. 25 219.62 90656.5 7 -1.20 11.21 o. 7771 16.7 3 NP 
t-va1ue -2.42* 0.24 o. 97 1. 21 -0.86 5.10* 
South Dakota -385.02 1. 30 -38.25 -13696.63 -1.38 9.92 0. 7275 12.81 NP 
t-va1ue -0.94 0. 34 -0.29 -0.28 -0.85 7.44* 
Kansas -369.62 5.38 459.49 -25620.05 -0.53 18.72 0.8008 19.29 NP 
t-va1ue -0.92 o. 90 1. 38 -1.13 -0.39 4.80* 
Virginia -15 70 .14 8.00 -154.43 -8217. 25 3.49 41.86 o. 7456 14.06 AP 
t-va1ue -6.66* 1.08 -0.43 -0.69 1. 35 2.02* 
West Virginia -40 33.02 -8.46 158.84 40125.46 -6.34 17.97 o. 9547 105.26 AP 
t-va1ue -6.26* -0.96 0.15 6 .12* -0.96 4.88* 
North C aro lin a -1901.84 -6.92 -879.32 497 90.59 4.68 -44.02 0.9436 83.68 AP 
t-va1ue -5. 93* -0.61 -2 .17* 3.42* 3.60* -2.51 * 
Kentucky -3142.26 -10.37 -2492.60 57132.74 7.87 -17.68 0. 9458 87.30 AP 
t-va1ue -4.61* -1.00 -2. 77* 3.48* 3.42* -1. 89* 
Tennessee -3068.38 -19.81 -2866.43 77058.24 -1.659 -54.875 o. 9622 127.13 AP 
t-va1ue -14.80* -2.38* -4. 31* 9.67* -0.78 -6.5 3* 
\.0 
1-' 
TABLE XV (Continued) 
States Intercept RIRG F POP RI T R2 F-Value Region 
South C aro 1 ina -1538.72 -3.21 -43.99 315 7 3. 95 -2.95 -13.02 0. 9456 83.43 SE 
t-value -14.32* -0.66 -0. 35 6.84* -2.59* -2.50* 
Georgia -1213.68 -8.86 -601.41 42459.13 -0.87 -25.46 o. 9313 65 .06 SE 
t-value -12.23* -2.10* -2.49* 5.5 2* -1.40 -2. 79* 
Florida 1308.76 -38.91 -366.90 10404.86 4.5 7 -34.47 0.9668 145. 46 SE 
t-value 2. 30* -4. 31* -0.84 2. 6 7* 3. 92* -2. 36* 
Alabama -1695.20 0.51 -76.17 21109. 36 1. 24 6.99 0.7805 17.06 SE 
t-value -3. 27* 0.05 -0.18 1.28 o. 87 0.72 
Mississippi -1927.00 7.40 782.56 23306. 35 -0.94 15.25 0.8323 23.82 DS 
t-va lue -4.38* 0.78 1.46 1.64 -0.54 3.07 
Arkansas -2069.47 16.01 390.7 3 33403.85 1.07 15.65 0.8005 19.26 DS 
t-value -5.67* 1.94* 0.5 2 2.10* 0.73 2.63* 
Louisiana -1788.43 1.41 914.06 35360.72 0. 45 -11. 27 0. 831 2 23.63 DS 
t-va lue -7.16* 0.11 1. 71* 1.78* 0.22 -0.50 
Oklahoma -1446.11 -2.72 -91.46 7256 7. 28 -0.27 -15.00 0.9373 71.75 SP 
t-value -13.05* -0.48 -0.24 6.59* -0. 21 -2. 97* 
*Significant at 10% level. 
\0 
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Some Explanations on the Sign 
Of Estimated Coefficients 
93 
In the previous section, mention was made of the expected signs 
for each variable. However, some coefficients do not show the 
expected signs. The problem may be caused by many factors. The first 
factor can be embedded in the methodology used in this study such as 
the assumption of linearity between dependent and independent 
variables in the models. This assumption might not be true in all 
models but it is necessary due to the lack of knowledge of true 
functional forms. The second can be caused by the theoretical 
framework in the study. The framework in this study is based on the 
capitalization formula and incorporates the concept of expectations 
about future earnings and discount rates. Generally this concept can 
be used to explain the price of capital stock. Nevertheless, this 
concept might not hold in some cases. The third factor that can 
distort the sign of coefficients is the data. Some data cannot be 
obtained directly. Imperfect proxies must be used. The final factor 
may be caused by a unique relationship between variables in some 
areas. Thus the signs of coefficients may be different from the 
expected. These factors represent only a few possible causes for 
unexpected signs in the model coefficients. For example, one of the 
factors that shows a high frequency of unexpected sign of coefficient 
is the proportion of Federal Land Bank loan made to total agricultural 
debts. This factor is introduced to capture the share or importance 
of Federal Land Bank in agricultural credit market. Since the data 
for total agricultural loans made for each state were not available, 
the total agricultural debts were used as proxies. Under this 
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scenario, it ts assumed that a direct relationship exists between 
agricultural debts and agricultural loans. In some cases, this 
relationship might not always hold because the increases in total 
loans made do not necessarily lead to increases in total agricultural 
debts due to high rate of repayment of the old loans. The 
agricultural debts become imperfect proxies for annual agricultural 
loans made to the farmers. Therefore, the signs of the coefficient 
can be distorted from the expected ones. 
In this chapter, the empirical result for each model was 
presented. Several equations by state were estimated to use tn 
selecting the most appropriate model. A brief explanation on the 
polynomial distributed lag model was also presented. In the next 
chapter, a series of hypotheses will be tested by using the models in 
this chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
MODEL STABILITY TEST 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the hypotheses advanced in 
Chapter I. A regression analysis will be applied to explain farmland 
price behavior. The results will be used for analysis and prediction. 
The Stability of Regression Coefficients 
Economic Determinants of Farmland 
Price Over Time 
The hypothesis that the econom1c structure of farmland pr1ce 
determination does not vary over time is tested using the Chow 
procedure. The data are divided into two sets. The first set covers 
the period 1952 to 1,969 while the second set covers the period 1970 to 
1982. The inflation rate was low and government programs strongly 
influenced commodity prices during the 1952 to 1969 period. General 
econom1c conditions, particularly agricultural market prices, were 
unstable during the second period. In addition, farmland prices rose 
persistently in most states for most of this latter period. The model 
structural coefficients could have remained unchanged despite changes 
in the variables between the two periods. 
structural stability can be calculated as: 
F 
(ESSR - ESSU)/k + 1 
ESSU/(n1 + n2 _ 2k _ 2) 
95 
Chow's F-test for 
96 
where 
ESSR = error sum squares for restrict model 
ESSU = error sum squares for unrestrict model 
n1 = number of observations in the first period 
n2 = number of observations in the second period 
k = number of explanatory variables excluding intercept 
term. 
If the calculated F-values exceed the critical F-values the hypothesis 
postulated is rejected. This implies that the estimated coefficients 
for the two periods are statistically different. The calculated 
F-values for the states considered are given in Table XVI. 
The first column of Table XVI shows the F-values for the 
rent-farmland price model. The results indicate that the hypothesis 
of structural stability is rejected in 12 of the 35 states studied. 
There are significant changes in the size of coefficients between 
these 2 periods in 12 states but in 23 states the response of the 
ren t-1 and price ratio has remained unchanged despite different levels 
of the real rate of interest, population pressure, and Federal Land 
Bank involvement. 
Column 2 presents the calculated F-values for the price model 
with rent as the predetermined variable. In contrast to the Ratio 
mode 1, the hypo thesis of structural stability is rejected in most of 
the states. The price model with net farm income indicates that the 
coefficients between the periods have changed for 29 states. The 
conclusion is that the coefficients of price models are less stable 






































TEST OF MODEL STABILITY BETWEEN 1952-1969 
AND 1970-1982 PERIODS BY STATES 
Rent-Land 

















































































































Regional Effect on the Structure of 
Farmland Models 
98 
The econometric models in Chapter IV were estimated using pooled 
data. The models assumed that the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables were the same in all the states. Chow's approach also is 
used to test the validity of this assumption. 
Table XVII presents the calculated F-values for each model. The 
results indicate that the coefficients vary across the states. The 
existence of state differences imply that the estimated coefficients 
from the state models are more appropriate to use for predicting state 
level values than those from pooled data models. 
Farmland Pricing: 1979-1982 
The recent decline in farmland prices have been attributed to its 
overvaluation of land 1n the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
"Overvaluation" may be attributed to speculation and other factors 
unjustified by prospective future earnings of farmland. A comparison 
of the actual and predicted values would shed some light on this 
1ssue. Higher than predicted values would suggest that the farmland 
is overpriced 1n relation to historic standards. The comparison would 
not indicate the precise deviation from the past trend due to the 
estimation procedure. The estimated coefficients from OLS method are 
influenced by actual values during the period under study. However, 
the differences between actual and predicted values can be considered 
as lower limits of deviation. 
A comparison for price models are shown in Table XVIII and XIX. 
These tables are limited to only selected farming states. The 
TABLE XVII 
TEST OF MODEL STABILITY AMONG STATES 
Models 
Rent-Farmland Price 
Price Model with Rent 
Price Model with Farm Income 







Northeastern States are omitted because these states have the least 
reliable data and did not experience significantly declining farmland 
values. 
Table XVIII 1s derived from price model with rent as an 
explanatory variable. The data show that in 1979 and 1980 the actual 
values were higher than the predicted values in most states. However, 
predicted errors are less than 8 percent in all states. Thus, it does 
not indicate unusual price differences from the regression trend. The 
error does not suggest that land was greatly overpriced by historic 
standards. 
The price model with farm income in Table XIX also shows that 
actual values are higher than predicted values in the same period. 
The predicted errors are higher than those from the previous model. 
All states show predicted error less than 10 percent except for Ohio 
and Indiana. The price models suggest that most states do not show a 
strong evidence of farmland overpricing during the period of 1979 and 
1980. Thus, the sharp recent decline in farmland price can be better 
explained by changes in variables in the farmland market rather than 
by over pricing farmland in the past. 
Concluding Remarks on Explanatory 
Variables in Farmland Models 
In the earlier chapters, many variables were introduced into 
farmland models. Some of the variables were important in explaining 
farmland market behavior but some of them were not. Remarks on some 



















FARMLAND PRICES BY STATE AND PREDICTED ERROR 
USING FARMLAND PRICE MODEL WITH RENT 
Actual Land Price ($) Predicted Error ($) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 
885 1039 1202 1196 17 33 67 21 
746 877 949 1007 26 -22 29 32 
1015 1221 1328 1384 0 -20 76 -10 
1675 1808 1868 1715 -7 108 -25 -22 
1622 1929 1986 1840 81 19 121 -49 
2126 2292 2393 2265 70 83 22 -97 
1780 2060 2174 2117 82 89 -2 -27 
746 866 899 916 16 7 1 6 
360 399 431 468 7 7 1 5 
293 339 359 375 4 17 -9 1 
854 949 959 1037 64 24 8 -21 
755 846 877 909 30 26 -5 1 
630 713 739 733 19 17 -6 -7 
494 580 691 759 -4 -14 16 -3 
702 764 889 1053 37 -10 -7 11 
510 597 620 696 -19 36 -7 -6 
Percentage Error (%) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 
1.92 3.17 5.57 1. 75 
3.48 -2.50 3.05 3.17 
0 -1.63 5.72 -0.72 
-0.41 5.97 -1.33 -1.28 
4.99 0.98 6.09 -2.66 
3.29 3.62 0.91 -4.28 
4.60 4.32 -0.09 -1.27 
2.14 0.80 0.11 0.65 
1.94 1. 75 0.23 1.06 
1.36 5.01 -2.50 0.26 
7.49 2.52 0.83 -2.02 
3.97 3.07 -0.57 0.11 
3 .. 01 2.38 -0.81 -0.95 
-0.80 -2.41 2.31 -0.39 
5.27 -1.30 -0.78 1.04 





















FARMLAND PRICES BY STATE AND PREDICTED 
ERROR USING FARMLAND PRICE MODEL 
WITH NET FARM INCOME 
Actual Land Price ($) Predicted Error ($) 
197 9 1980 1981 1982 1979 1980 1981 1982 
885 1039 1202 1196 1 62 -14 3 
746 877 949 1007 13 -9 11 70 
1015 1221 1328 1384 -10 -18 77 -5 
16 75 1808 1868 1715 281 145 60 -77 
1622 1929 1986 1840 66 238 80 -177 
2126 2292 2393 2265 89 228 75 -188 
1780 2060 2174 2117 76 82 -20 -18 
746 866 899 916 38 12 22 -16 
360 399 431 468 -2 4 -6 8 
293 339 359 375 l 21 -5 -7 
854 949 959 1037 65 17 23 -27 
755 846 877 909 21 42 7 -6 
630 713 739 733 -14 4 -5 -15 
494 580 691 759 2 -6 19 -5 
702 764 889 105 3 24 7 -14 17 
510 597 620 696 13 31 -16 -2 
Percentage Error (%) 
197 9 1980 1981 1982 
0.11 5.96 -1.16 0. 25 
1. 74 -1.02 1.15 6. 95 
-0.98 -1.47 5.79 -0.36 
16.77 8.02 3. 21 -4.48 
4.06 12.33 4.02 -9.61 
4.18 9.94 3.13 -8.30 
4.26 3.98 -0.92 -0.85 
5.09 1. 38 2.44 -1.74 
-0.55 1.00 -1.39 1. 70 
0. 34 6.19 -1.39 -1.86 
7.61 1. 79 2. 39 -2.60 
2.78 4.96 o. 79 -0.66 
-2.22 0.56 -0.67 -2.04 
0.40 -1.03 2.74 -0.65 
3.41 0.91 -1.5 7 1.61 





Real Interest Rate on Farm Mortgage Loans 
This variable is considered as an opportunity cost or discount 
rate for investing in farmland. In the pooled model (Table X) for 
rent-farmland price ratio, the estimated coefficient shows for every 1. 
percentage point increase in real intere·st rate on farm mortgage 
loans, the ratio of rent to farmland price increases by 0.3 percent, 
other things equal. During 1980 the average real interest rate on 
farm mortgage loans was -1.07 percent at the national level. In 1982 
the average real interest rate increased to 3.6 percent or by 4.67 
percentage points within 2 years. Therefore, the average value of 
rent-farmland price ratio was predicted to increase by about 1.4 
percent. This result partially explains the increases in the value of 
the ratio in recent years. If the rent-farmland price ratio is 
considered as a rate of return on farmland and real interest rate as 
opportunity cost, then the higher value of the opportunity cost would 
cause the farmland market to adjust to obtain higher rate of return 
(ratio). An increase in rate of return can be accomplished by either 
an increase in rent or a decrease in farmland price or a combination 
of both. 
In the price model at the aggregated level, real interest rate on 
farm mortgage loans did not show the expected sign due to 
multicollinearity in the estimated model. The sign and the magnitude 
of the coefficient can be misleading. Therefore, it can not be used 
to explain the effect of this variable on the price model. 
The Share of Credit Institutions on 
Total Agricultural Loans 
104 
This factor is used to represent the importance of the credit 
institutions on farmland models. In this study only the proportion of 
Federal Land Bank loans to total agricultural debts showed a 
significant coefficient. The econometric models indicate that, at the 
aggregated level, a 1 percent increase in proportion of loans made 
cause a decline in rent-farmland price by 0.013 percent. 
The price model showed that 1 percent increase in the proportion 
of 1 o an s made by the Federal Land Bank enhances the farmland price by 
1.85 dollars at the aggregated level. Although this variable is 
important in farmland models, its effects on the dependent variables 
are very small. For example, a 10 percent increase in the share of 
Federal Land Bank causes a decline of 0.13 percent 'in the value of 
rent-farmland price ratio and an increase of 18.5 dollars in farmland 
price. 
Urbanization Factor 
The popu 1 a tion density is used as a proxy for this factor. This 
variable coefficient is significant in both price and ratio models. 
At the aggregate level, the ratio model indicated that an increase of 
1 person/square mile reduces the value of ratio by 0.0044 percent. 
The average population density for 35 states studied was 204 
persons/square miles and was 206 persons/square mile in 1980 and 1982 
respectively. Given an increase of 2 persons/square mile, the 
population factor should depress the value of the ratio by about 0.009 
percent. 
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In the aggregated price model, a unit increase ~n population 
density is predicted to increase .farmland price by 1.05 dollars. 
Hence from 1980 to 1982, the population factor on average increased 
farmland price by 2.10 dollars. Like the Federal Land Bank variable, 
population density has little impact on the values of the dependent 
variables. The variable has a sizable impact on land price in highly 
urbanized states, however. 
Time Variable 
This variable is introduced to capture the effect of trend and 
other excluded factors in the models. The variable is significant in 
all models when pooled data were used. At the aggregated level, the 
variable has a negative effect in the ratio model. This means that 
the rent-farmland price ratio declined during the period under study. 
The result in Table X, Chapter IV, indicated that in 1 year the time 
variable reduced the ratio value by 0.133 percent. Therefore, for a 
10 year period, the value would decline by about 1.33 percent, given 
other things equal. The decline in rent-farmland price ratio during 
that period indicates that the investors are willing to accept a lower 
rate of return on farmland earnings in terms of the rent-price ratio. 
The time variable also shows a positive effect in the price 
model. The model in Table X showed that a 1 year increase in this 
variable caused land price to ~ncrease by 15.38 dollars. This might 
be attributable to the declining real interest rate between the 1960s 
and 1970s due to inflation or other variables not fully accounted for 
in the mode 1 • 
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Inflation 
The re su 1 t s t-test of coefficients from the econometric model do 
not support the postulate that inflation has an independent effect on 
farmland price. The inflation indirectly affects the farmland market 
through the real rate of interest. The high rate of unanticipated 
inflation can cause a low real rate of interest if creditors are slow. 
to adjust the nominal rate of interest to keep up with inflation. In 
addition, inflation affects farmland price through its interaction 
with the marginal tax rate. Although this interaction is significant 
in the econometric models, it has a problem of multicollinearity with 
the real interest rate. 
The hypothesis (see Chapter I) that a change in anticipated 
inflation has no impact on the structural coefficients of farmland 
models was further tested by using the Chow Test as outlines in 
Chapter II. The data were divided into 2 approximately equal sets 
using the percent change in GNP deflator as a criterion. By 
coincidence, the first set fell into the period 1952-67 while the 
second set fell into the 1968-82 period. 
Table XX shows the F-values for the test. The findings indicate 
that in .the ratio model, the hypothesis is rejected in 18 states. The 
price model incorporating the farmland rent shows that 16 states 
reject the hypo thesis while that inc9rporating farm income indicates 
that 24 states reject the hypothesis. According to the criterion, the 
ratio model shows that about one half of the states have different 
coefficients in these 2 periods. The price model with rent also shows 
the same result. On the other hand, the structural coefficients of 






































TEST OF MODEL STABILITY UNDER HIGH AND 
LOW INFLATION PERIODS BY STATES 
Rent-Land 
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course, factors other than inflation which differ between the 2 time 
periods could also account for observed differences in the structure 
of the land price models. 
In summary, results from the econometric model t-tests indicate 
that inflation has no independ·ent effect on farmland price models. 
However, the stability test shows that the structural coefficients of 
the models may be influenced by the rate of inflation. 
Rent 
The rent factor shows a significant coefficient in farmland 
model. An increase in rent raises farmland price. At the state level 
for the price model, the rent variable has the highest number of 
significant coefficients. Rent is an important factor determining 
farmland price. 
Net Farm Income 
As stated earlier, net farm income was used as a substitute for 
the rent value at the state level. However, in terms of statistical 
significance, the variable does not perform as well as the rent 
variable. Rent is a better proxy than farm income because it reflects 
changes in land character is tics, return to scale, and substitution 
effect between land and other inputs. Usually, net farm income does 
not reflect the above relationships influencing land earnings. 
This chapter summarized the results of the econometric models 
obtained from the previous chapter. The tests for structural 
stability of the coefficients in each model were performed. Brief 
remarks on selected variables were presented. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This chapter presents a summary of the study and its findings. 
The problems encountered in this study are briefly mentioned. 
Finally, recommendations for further study are made. 
Summary and Implications 
The primary objective of this study is to exam1ne the factors 
that explain the variation of farmland price and rent-farmland price 
ratio. The conceptual framework was developed based on stock 
capitalization. Two basic econometric models were developed. A 
number of explanatory variables were introduced into each model to 
identify the important factors. A second degree polynomial lag model 
was applied to capture the influence of expected increases in farmland 
earnings. Pooled cross-section and time-series data were used in this 
step. Based on theoretical and statistical considerations, a set of 
explanatory variables was selected. State level as well aggregated 
econometric models were estimated using the selected set of 
explanatory variables. 
The analysis of the farmland model indicated that real rate of 
interest on farm mortgage loans, share of Federal Land Bank loans made 
to the total debts, population density, rent, and time trend are 
important factors explaining farmland price. For the given set of 
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variables in the study, the population density and time were the 
important non-agricultural factors. 
The results from the econometric models indicate that rent as an 
earning factor has a positive impact on farmland price. In addition, 
rent is also a· better proxy for farmland earnings than is farm income 
to explain farmland price. Although the involvement of credit 
institution such as the Federal Land Bank and urbanization factor are 
significant in the model, their impact on farmland value at the 
aggregate level is minimal. The real rate of interest on farm 
mortgage loans is a better proxy for opportunity cost or discount rate 
for investing in farmland than real rate of return on common stock and 
long-term government bonds. Recent decline in farmland value can be 
partially explained by the increase in the real rate of interest on 
farm mortgage loans. 
The analysis did not indicate that farmland was substantially 
overvalued during 1979-1982. The econometric models did not support 
the hypothesis that inflation, as a variable, had an independent 
effect on farmland price. However, unanticipated inflation could 
indirectly influence farmland price through the real rate of interest 
on farm mortgage loans. 
Theoretically, the expected growth rate of net returns influences 
the value of the real estate. However, the study did not corroborate 
the relationship. 
This study supports the result derived by Martin and Heady (1982) 
that the relationship between expected growth rate of real estate 
earnings and real estate value cannot be established. Unlike some of 
the past studies, the econometric models from this study do not 
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indicate that speculative capital gain is an important explanatory 
variable in farmland price model. 
Tests for structural stability of the coefficients were carried 
out. The results of the price and ratio models indicated that there 
were differences among states in estimated coefficients. The test for 
the structural stability over time showed that the coefficients of 
ratio model in most states were more stable than of the price models. 
When the inflation rate was applied as a criterion for separating the 
data set, the results of price and ratio models suggested that 
inflation was associated with differences 1n the estimated 
coefficients in most states. 
As indicated by the stability tests, using an aggregate model to 
predict individual state land prices is inappropriated. The test also 
shows that there are changes in the structural coefficients over time 
in some states. 
Because the real rate of interest on farm mortgage loans 
influences the farmland value, large government deficits caus1ng high 
real interest rates reduce farmland price, other things equal. 
Results of this study do not support the hypothesis that farmland 
market participants behaved errationally or specutively, drawing land 
prices or current rates of return to levels unjustified based on 
conditions in the late 1970s. Rather, the results suggest that sharp 
changes 1n land values tend to be caused by factors such as real 
interest rate changes which appropriate macroeconomic policies can 
dampen. 
Some farmers depend heavily on credit provided by using farmland 
as collateral. A rapid decline in farmland price can cause liquidity 
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problems to many farmers. A po 1 icy which attempts to reduce the 
budget deficit will be beneficial to the farmers through the 
alleviation of the lingering effects of the budget deficit on the real 
interest rate. 
Limitations and Further Research 
This study had data limitations. The data on farmland price were 
obtained from USDA unpublished worksheets. Because the land price and 
rent data for the Northeastern States are based on small samples, the 
times series are erratic and not very reliable. The data show a 
stochastic pattern in farmland value unrelated to explanatory 
variables, especially in the earlier years of the period studied. 
This problem may be attributable not only to few observations on cash 
rent but also to the heterogeneous characteristics of farmland in that 
region and to the strong urban influence on land price. Another data 
problem is shortcomings in explanatory variables such as a proportion 
of Farmers Home Administration loans made to total agricultural loans. 
The proportion at the national level was used due to lack of "data at 
the state level. 
The methodology used in this study has several limitations 
including the assumption of linearity between dependent and 
independent variables in the models. It is difficult to account for 
all interactions among variables and for the many possible lagged 
responses to variables. 
Because results from this study showed that the structural 
coefficients of the econometric model are different among states, 
further research at the regional or state level is recommended for 
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capturing local differences. Future research that incorporates more 
information from the 1980s, a period of declining farmland price, will 
also be useful. A detailed investigation of particular sub-periods 
will be worthwhile because the structural factors could have changed 
over time. 
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APPENDIX 
VALUE OF NET CASH RENT AND FARMLAND 




DEFINITIONS FOR THE VARIABLE RV IN TABLE XXII 
State Net Cash Rent (RV) Farmland Price (RV) 
Maine 1 2 
New Hampshire 3 4 
Vermont 5 6 
Massachusetts 7 8 
Rhode Island 9 10 
Connecticut 11 12 
New York 13 14 
New Jersey 15 16 
Pennsylvania 17 18 
Delaware 19 20 
Maryland 21 22 
Michigan 23 24 
Wisconsin 25 26 
Minnesota 27 28 
Ohio 29 30 
Indiana 31 32 
Illinois 33 34 
Iowa 35 36 
Missouri 37 38 
North Dakota 39 40 
South Dakota 41 42 
Kansas 45 46 
Virginia 47 48 
West Virginia 49 so 
North Carolina 51 52 
Kentucky 53 54 
Tennessee 55 56 
South Carolina 57 58 
Georgia 59 60 
Florida 61 62 
Alabama 63 64 
Mississippi 65 66 
Arkansas 67 68 
Louisiana 69 70 
Oklahoma 71 72 
TABLE XXII 
FARMLAND PRICE AND tTET CASH RENT BY STATES ($/ACRE) 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
0 R R R R R R R R R v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
B v v v v v v v v v I I I I I I I I I I 2 2 2 2 
s I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 0 I 2 3 
I 9 18 74 3 51 40 3.99 6 I 10.70 166 10.79 283 8.69 200 3.02 71 5 20 198 5.33 122 4.91 162 8. 13 130 8.46 
2 7.88 94 5.20 147 2.69 46 7.32 120 12.86 325 I 42 90 4.75 86 5 42 220 5 05 116 5.28 113 6.91 144 9.07 
3 9 06 64 3.47 250 4. 13 90 5.22 115 16.32 275 8 62 212 4 22 79 6 88 215 5 66 124 5 50 125 7.47 147 9.10 
4 5 4 I 68 4.88 92 3.59 88 5 02 132 6.84 200 12. 12 227 3 43 75 7.40 259 5.44 128 5.02 123 8.57 157 8.44 
5 6 57 80 4.58 60 3.67 58 5.27 127 20 98 400 4.38 228 4.08 80 6.68 273 5. 17 121 7 56 163 8.35 152 9.93 
6 3.93 54 5 43 65 5.05 72 4.72 113 19.31 400 4.63 193 4.54 80 6.83 283 5.60 125 II. 36 159 10.69 194 10.32 
7 6.10 79 5.61 112 3.37 52 6.60 157 12.32 383 4.21 232 5.39 92 8 12 376 6.27 148 12.34 201 8.37 222 10.36 
8 5.6 I 65 6.21 72 6 04 102 3 64 133 14.20 333 5 41 229 5.25 95 B 6 I 356 6.47 149 12.72 204 8.91 186 11.21 
9 8.25 75 7.57 95 6.51 86 1. 41 164 13 90 250 3. 76 237 5 81 lOG 6.02 408 G.28 158 10.4 I 191 10.5G 197 I 1. 72 
10 8.09 75. 3.42 97 5.27 92 6 32 154 12.83 380 6 23 282 G 05 98 9.85 353 G.34 IGO 12.5G 282 I I. 27 193 I I .57 
11 9.84 83 3.26 88 5.58 113 2.25 186 1G 10 331 15 64 386 5 59 102 3 74 388 G.38 167 14.28 290 9.39 203 12.02 
12 6. 71 61 6.06 100 5 80 86 6.59 1/5 17.57 525 5.03 238 6 64 105 3 61 476 6.34 171 15 74 303 7.70 195 12.21 
13 G.OB G7 6.70 89 3.79 73 6.37 159 22.64 600 5.61 258 6.50 lOG 4.73 382 6.26 173 14.92 350 10.26 250 12.69 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
0 v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
B 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
s 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 5 6 7 8 9 
I 152 8.65 136 7.42 140 7.98 172 I 1.03 210 12 24 273 10.51 231 6.50 107 2.33 37 4. 17 67 4.92 86 7.73 115 4.79 
2 IG4 9.42 134 7 98 139 7.96 167 It. 4 I 200 12.50 274 11 08 224 6. 3·1 101 2 27 38 3.97 G3 5.03 90 9.02 134 G. 14 
3 163 8 90 123 8 22 139 8.23 187 12.26 200 13 17 287 I I 17 220 6.31 103 2 48 39 3 88 6 I 4.55 84 II .06 122 6.66 
4 159 9.33 140 8 56 148 8.90 193 11 19 221 13 54 295 11 78 234 6.45 109 2.21 35 3.99 GO 4.73 93 10.56 109 4.83 
5 190 9.72 138 9 50 156 9.03 195 12.85 224 14. 12 301 12 46 210 6 98 113 2.75 39 4.40 62 5. 15 95 10.33 130 6.32 
6 195 9.65 136 9.86 172 I I. 18 218 14 48 229 15.27 327 12 90 247 9.05 120 3.00 43 4.07 63 5.39 96 12.30 133 6. 18 
7 205 9.99 148 10.49 177 10.44 212 13 65 243 16 28 329 13 43 256 7.30 122 3.27 45 4.24 66 5.44 102 10.74 13 I 4. 21 
8 223 10.28 147 I I. 67 194 10 63 224 15.38 253 15 55 365 13.88 270 9.38 135 3 93 50 4 78 78 5.80 102 II . 13 I 4 I 6.48 
9 228 11.11 157 II. 62 194 10.35 229 15.65 270 16 50 379 14.32 280 8.26 127 4.08 53 4.67 72 6. 11 Ill I 1.63 134 4.92 
10 239 10.25 160 I I .63 192 10.80 225 15.79 261 16 59 364 13 87 265 9 18 137 3.87 54 4 86 80 5.89 118 13.64 151 5.22 
II 248 10.55 159 I I. 79 191 10.70 228 16.05 258 16.36 367 14 95 282 8 77 146 3.92 56 4.73 78 6.61 116 I I .92 165 5.64 
12 24 I 12.02 17 I 11.89 193 I I. 73 260 16.94 277 17.76 390 15 32 28 I 9.92 154 4.40 60 4.65 80 7. I I 12 I 12.42 158 5.33 
13 258 II. 57 168 12.98 208 12.35 266 18.38 310 18.25 396 15.81 293 II. 47 173 4.57 64 5.65 87 7.21 126 I I .90 162 5.92 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
0 v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
B 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 
s 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 T 
I 69 19.92 143 I I. 19 147 10 69 111 6.54 76 6. 12 56 4.84 59 0 5.51 G I 8.44 GO 8.20 86 7.51 92 3.66 76 52 
2 70 21.38 153 12.01 147 I I .05 115 7.02 76 6.05 58 5.39 63.0 6.28 GO 8.06 66 8.74 86 8.29 99 4 .Of 75 53 
3 75 24.87 192 9 GO 123 10 46 113 7.07 76 5.64 52 8.66 98 0 6 02 GO 9 30 76 8. 11 85 9.67 107 3.90 7 I 54 
4 56 23.81 189 12.04 167 10.83 I 12 6 54 8 I 6.28 62 7.84 83 0 5 80 64 9.88 78 10 17 91 9. 26 lOG 3.95 77 55 
5 63 15.22 159 11 90 169 II 00 122 7.34 93 7.46 65 7.60 104 0 7 02 68 12.76 91 9.30 101 8 87 107 4. It 80 56 
6 60 16.31 194 12.98 145 12.78 124 7.44 97 8 15 73 7 23 131 0 7 85 7 I 12 13 88 8.58 94 8.69 102 4.37 85 57 
7 64 14.72 163 12.65 148 12.39 122 7 48 102 8 36 77 6.52 I 19.0 7.39 77 I I. 92 too to.87 104 9 65 12 I 4.28 86 58 
8 69 14.99 202 II 81 154 13.47 140 8.25 109 9 06 84 4 92 97 0 8. 12, 84 12 42 94 12.08 110 10.42 156 5.00 96 59 
9 GO 15 GG 206 13 OJ 169 14 24 151 8.73 118 9 16 89 5.48 118 0 8.26 85 12.92 103 10 66 114 10.34 184 4.81 101 60 
10 64 19.03 219 13 80 188 14 85 154 9 02 1 14 9 23 93 3 74 102 0 8.80 89 12. I I 105 10.64 123 10 25 152 4.96 103 G I 
II 63 19.04 245 15.63 197 15.87 168 9 01 12 I to t8 101 5 4•1 I 19.0 8 10 88 13.70 I 17 I I. 17 141 12.29 174 5.08 I 12 62 ....... N 
12 81 21.49 251 17 65 204 15 85 173 10 10 140 10 69 109 5 t 4 119 5 8.94 102 13 79 132 13.56 162 13.71 186 5.50 126 63 ....... 
13 65 21.54 260 14 04 181 16.83 188 10.66 144 I 1.98 124 4. 7 I 120.0 9 59 103 14.04 122 14. 19 177 14.75 213 5.58 137 64 
TABLE XXII (Continued) 
R R R R R R R R R R A A A A 
0 R R R R R R R R R v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
B v v v v v v v v v I I I I I I I I I I 2 2 2 2 
5 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 
7 8 9 0 I 2 3 
14 6.57 72 6.63 192 7.00 103 5.56 219 14.35 520 8 43 405 7.86 123 0 3.81 433 6 46 
198 17 91 333 10.96 282 13.29 
15 6.72 82 4.55 123 4 42 96 5.77 196 23.83 900 4.72 362 6 76 125 0 4. 17 515 7.55 
227 18.06 327 11.51 314 14.13 
16 10 66 117 3.06 145 6.05 124 7.36 259 14.82 500 7.94 432 6.42 134.0 3 39 593 7 95 
216 17.31 420 9.48 346 17. II 
17 6.94 81 6.58 170 3.69 116 9. II 250 8.95 750 -0.44 405 7 94 156.0 6. 12 686 7.95 
252 19.79 438 10.68 398 14.65 
18 11.51 115 9.79 231 8.55 152 5.90 236 -2.88 500 5.29 483 8.90 174.0 2.79 707 7.96 281 21.02 
541 10.05 445 II. 93 
19 9.60 127 4.55 179 5.21 162 8.27 302 11.33 625 3.87 421 6 86 163 0 5.38 740 7.43 
344 21.05 512 10.00 512 10.91 
20 14.75 147 14.58 278 6.86 210 0.30 295 19.06 1500 0.04 632 8.37 170.0 7.00 923 8.68 332 2 I. 45 
546 10.45 439 14.52 
21 15.06 196 12.26 306 5 47 227 8.94 527 15.43 1000 0.35 962 10.26 187 0 2.10 1515 11.75 
463 18 93 404 11.94 617 13.59 
22 12.14 200 8.58 425 7.56 276 1.03 472 7 27 1000 6.54 1044 7.47 226 0 3.00 1678 12.65 541 20.41 
464 12.68 756 14.91 
23 14.81 217 10.37 439 10.65 352 2.36 850 19.40 2000 I. 16 1304 8.54 268.0 10.21 1650 13.44 
646 25.26 682 14.71 684 18.03 
24 12.74 232 8.28 333 12.01 357 4.87 692 8 61 1285 5.67 1050 8.65 282 0 7.63 2037 15.30 
844 27.46 744 14.33 847 19.41 
25 II. 19 231 9.50 400 13 22 398 1.68 873 -2 30 1000 5.79 1050 9.36 269.0 2.98 1830 16.59 
884 30 81 969 17.16 1157 20.90 
26 9.48 303 8.69 667 14.70 378 2.24 677 5.64 1505 15.99 1104 9.82 330.0 6.17181317.74 
960 34.34 1072 20.25 1138 24.55 
A A A A A R A R A A A A A R A A R 
A R A A R R R 
0 v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
v 
B 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 ·a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 
5 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 
9 0 I 2 5 6 7 8 9 
14 271 11.53 lBO 13.20 212 12.71 278 19.32 324 19 50 441 16 96 312 10.51 178 4.85 
67 5.66 89 7. 31 135 13.22 175 6.20 
15 301 12.80 188 14.74 228 14.32 311 21.36 367 22.60 478 19 56 357 12 27 205 5.91 
75 6.05 93 8.62 168 14.11 185 6.26 
16 328 12.41 201 15.37 240 14.08 324 22.82 404 24 14 517 21 46 386 12.52 209 
6.09 78 5.86 97 8. 14 163 13.92 200 6.25 
17 350 12 61 214 17.23 266 15.79 385 24.73 453 27.03 533 23 41 421 12.99 231 7.01 
88 6. 56 107 8.35 175 13.29 224 6.07 
18 303 13.51 245 17.40 273 15.28 381 24:67 448 27 66 586 25.61 440 14.61 256 
7.28 90 1. 32 Ill 8.47 175 12.90 235 5.96 
19 290 13.87 270 17.88 281 16.49 384 24. 18 433 28 49 613 26.69 453 15.15 274 7.31 
95 7.23 114 9.89 193 13.13 252 5.10 
20 319 14.27 288 18.45 292 18. 13 419 25.61 455 29.17 601 27 50 456 16.57 267 
7.29 95 7.39 114 10.10 183 14.52 277 8.14 
21 363 13 95 260 16.85 265 21.22 458 27.32 465 28 27 565 29 59 466 18 32 301 
8.30 Ill 6.65 104 II. 21 198 13.13 318 10.64 
22 405 15.68 301 17.75 292 22.49 505 29.88 509 30 56 619 32 73 533 20.09 333 
8.83 119 7.21 117 11.79 218 14.32 374 13.29 
23 500 17.78 351 24.32 389 26.88 641 36.49 611 39.62 815 46.33 
694 24 30 413 13.16 165 9.01 154 14.51 278 15.20 464 11.97 
24 518 20.97 397 31.29 484 31.97 742 51 17 76147.13 954 52.40 
836 26.28 430 15 13 219 10.34 173 16.28 323 15.96 492 14.88 
25 587 22.43 453 38.36 598 39. II 1010 60.04 962 57.89 1248 60 99 1109 28 42 501 
18.36 272 12.26 211 17.50 344 18.43 580 21.02 
26 720 27.68 546 43.57 758 45.68 1116 72.83 1330 70.04 1653 69.98 1393 33.63 568 18.40 301 
13.71 244 17.66 374 24.37 601 16.64 
R R A R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
R R R R R R 
0 v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
B 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 
6 6 6 6 6 7 1 1 
s 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
I 2 T 
14 80 21 .94 290 14. 13 2 17 19 . 12 204 11.32 160 13.52 136 7.45 152 11.90 Ill 
16.04 158 14.02 194 15.31 255 6.45 152 65 
15 92 21.60 308 16.24 207 21.76 230 II 36 162 15 01 152 9 22 175 12.90 126 17.41 
184 14.24 202 15.27 272 6 97 164 66 
16 94 2 I .06 298 19.58 260 18.96 236 11.66 174 13 32 165 7 37 182 10.29 132 18 36 199 13 83 
211 14.01 300 6.54 166 67 
17 91 20.42 305 18.59 336 20.74 278 II 61 188 13 91 175 9.00 273 II 52 151 24.26 201 
15.05 237 12.98 262 7. 15 189 68 
18 147 18.82 297 18.00 263 18 07 279 12.41 218 14.35 196 9.07 261 10.45 168 16.25 223 13 44 
235 15.11 318 7.49 191 69 
19 119 17.76 334 17.65 290 18.04 283 12.07 220 14 13 237 1 60 306 12 67 169 16.43 226 14.22 
262 15.34 338 8.35 212 70 
20 131 19.04 326 19.61 264 18.67 318 13 21 230 16.38 250 6 61 229 12 44 194 15 89 244 
18.01 282 15.92 355 8.84 227 71 
21 166 17.98 368 21.30 336 19.24 305 13.86 265 17.67 296 4 93 289 13.71 218 .16.86 289 21.03 
323 16.24 379 8.63 216 72 
22 265 19.51 448 22.13 363 20.86 346 13.83 302 17 57 358 8 4' 42' 14.65 267 
IB 36 309 20.67 347 17.32 391 9.50 239 73 
23 274 21.73 499 24.26 404 23 17 401 14.23 3-12 18.13 436 12.03 650 16 II 311 20.07 366 23.13 
390 21.63 406 11.68 299 74 
24 453 22.60 573 25:57 447 24.80 459 15 14 419 21 39 483 10 44 732 17.16 328 22 33 393 24 82 
405 23.75 491 13 09 347 75 ...... 
25 427 23.98 615 28.03 542 26.68 519 16.61 432 22 39 527 8 61 582 18.78 362 23 00 414 24 99 
453 22. to 512 14.70 399 76 N 
26 448 28.82 667 37.29 624 30.06 571 18.43 510 25.31 558 10.52 683 22.01 415 25.36 433 27.20 
519 34.22 616 15.75 431 77 N 
0 R R R R 
B v v v v 
s I 2 3 4 
27 12.25 390 11.89 639 
28 13 10 414 II. 14 712 
29 15.54 438 16.49 749 
30 12.45 794 12.82 967 
31 15.03 604 15. 16 1250 
R R R R 
0 v v v v 
B 2 2 2 2 
s 4 5 6 7 
27 789 30. I I 630 44.36 
28 885 31.04 746 49.24 
29 1039 32.42 877 54.84 
30 1202 34 67 949 58 05 
31 1196 37 98 1007 62.71 
R R R R 
0 v v v v 
B 5 5 5 5 
s 0 I 2 3 
27 414 25.50. 694 35 83 
28 623 30.97 759 37.94 
29 782 24.07 872 43.70 
30 690 33.65 924 45.85 
31 763 34.98 1005 50.01 
TABLE XXII (Continued) 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
R R R R R v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
v v v v v I I I I I I I I I I 2 2 2 2 
5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 
10.58 404 0.43 709 4.42 1660 9 17 1130 12 37 325 0 9 09 2171 19.72 1059 39.14 1347 20.77 1394 24.48 
10.59 506 5.41 1078 -5. 10 500 I I. 10 1475 14 07 357 0 12 99 2305 21.15 1275 39.49 1451 30.57 1333 25.29 
16 33 629 I .56 1246 6.72 1075 11 99 1820 13 39 365 0 15.45 2367 22.34 1479 47.49 1606 33.4 I 1720 28.85 
7.29 594 10.99 1805 -I. 95 1138 1 I. 94 1583 13.98 439 0 15.63 2473 25.32 1465 55.05 1920 36.45 1756 30.46 
8.73 725 4.63 1153 -2. 15 1186 I "' 1150 15.42 459.9 20.93 2475 27.10 1482 55 32 1638 39.79 1817 28.33 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 5 6 7 8 9 
867 5 I. 78 1305 74.76 1434 73 25 1923 73 61 1537 37.20 636 17.96 302 14 41 269 17.83 415 25.33 685 8.74 
1015 60.73 1675 78.34 1622 79 39 2126 80 04 1780 41 41 746 20 58 360 14.81 293 21.08 455 22.49 712 13.73 
1221 63 65 1808 86.57 1929 85.98 2292 86. 15 2060 47 58 866 22. 10 399 16.62 339 22.41 517 23.97 836 14.72 
1328 70.27 1868 93 20 1986 91.72 2393 91.48 2174 49.95 899 23 50 431 18.31 359 24. I~ 587 26.95 845 17.43 
1384 7 I .93 1715 90.40 1840 97.81 2265 95. II 2117 49 56 916 25.17 468 18.55 375 25.72 582 32.22 989 16.47 
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R 
v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v v 
5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1 1 1 
4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 I 2 T 
702 33.22 669 19.30 544 26 08 587 13.15 675 22.80 431 26 68 506 28.79 577 32.04 711 15.09 447 78 
854 34 10 755 21.70 605 26 25 630 14.95 898 24 68 494 29.16 580 31.22 702 40.01 925 17.98 510 79 
949 37.75 846 22.48 654 27.24 713 12.01 726 27.40 580 33.29 688 37 56 764 44.61 977 11.32 597 80 
959 40.38 877 24.68 727 28 80 739 10.67 779 28 10 691 35.34 820 38 62 889 4 I. 11 1086 18.80 620 81 
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